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Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential 
determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-
utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian 
responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some 
people to save many others (‘instrumental harm’) reduces trust, while maximizing the 
welfare of everyone equally (‘impartial beneficence’) may increase trust. In a multi-site 
experiment spanning 22 countries on six continents, participants (N = 23,929) 
completed self-report (N = 17,591) and behavioral (N = 12,638) measures of trust in 
leaders who endorsed utilitarian or non-utilitarian principles in dilemmas concerning the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the self-report and behavioral measures, 
endorsement of instrumental harm decreased trust, while endorsement of impartial 
beneficence increased trust. These results show how support for different ethical 
principles can impact trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication during 
times of global crisis. 
 
Protocol Registration Statement 
The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 




During times of crisis, such as wars, natural disasters, or pandemics, citizens 
look to leaders for guidance. Successful crisis management often depends on 
mobilizing individual citizens to change their behaviors and make personal sacrifices for 
the public good 1. Crucial to this endeavour is trust: citizens are more likely to follow 
official guidance when they trust their leaders 2. Here, we investigate public trust in 
leaders in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to threaten millions 
of lives around the globe at the time of writing 3,4. 
Because the novel coronavirus is highly transmissible, a critical factor in limiting 
pandemic spread is compliance with public health recommendations such as social 
distancing, physical hygiene and mask wearing 5,6. Trust in leaders is a strong predictor 
of citizen compliance with a variety of public health policies 7–12. During pandemics, trust 
in experts issuing public health guidelines is a key predictor of compliance with those 
guidelines. For example, during the avian influenza pandemic of 2009 (H1N1), self-
reported trust in medical organizations predicted self-reported compliance with 
protective health measures and vaccination rates 13,14. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
data from several countries show that public trust in scientists, doctors and the 
government is positively associated with self-reported compliance with public health 
recommendations 15,16,17,18. These data suggest that trust in leaders is likely to be a key 
predictor of long-term success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic around the globe. 
However, the factors that determine trust in leaders during global crises remain 
understudied. 
One possible determinant of trust in leaders during a crisis is how they resolve 
moral dilemmas that pit distinct ethical principles against one another. The COVID-19 
pandemic has raised particularly stark dilemmas of this kind, for instance whether to 
prioritize young and otherwise healthy people over older people and those with chronic 
illnesses when allocating scarce medical treatments 19,20. This dilemma and similar 
others highlight a tension between two major approaches to ethics. Consequentialist 
theories – of which utilitarianism is the most well-known exemplar 21 – posit that only 
consequences should matter when making moral decisions. Because younger, healthier 
people are more likely to recover and have longer lives ahead of them, utilitarians would 
argue that they should be prioritized for care because this is likely to produce the best 
overall consequences 22–24. In contrast, non-utilitarian theories of morality, such as 
deontological theories 25–29, argue that morality should consider more than just 
consequences, including rights, duties, and obligations (see Supplementary Note 1 for 
further details). Non-utilitarians, on deontological grounds, could argue that everyone 
who is eligible (e.g., by being a citizen and/or contributing through taxes or private 
health insurance) has an equal right to receive medical care, and therefore it is wrong to 
prioritize some over others 30. While it is unlikely that ordinary citizens explicitly think 
about moral issues in terms of specific ethical theories 21,31, past work shows that these 
philosophical concepts explain substantial variance in the moral judgments of ordinary 
citizens 32,33, including those in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic 34. 
There is robust evidence that people who endorse utilitarian principles in 
sacrificial dilemmas – deeming it morally acceptable to sacrifice some lives to save 
many others – are seen as less moral and trustworthy, chosen less frequently as social 
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partners, and trusted less in economic exchanges than people who take a non-utilitarian 
position and reject sacrificing some to save many 35–40. This suggests that leaders who 
take a utilitarian approach to COVID-19 dilemmas will be trusted less than leaders who 
take a non-utilitarian approach. Anecdotally, some recent case studies of public 
communications are consistent with this hypothesis. In the United States, for example, 
public discussions around whether to reopen schools and the economy versus remain 
in lockdown highlighted tensions between utilitarian approaches and other ethical 
principles, with some leaders stressing an imperative to remain in lockdown to prevent 
deaths from COVID-19 (consistent with deontological principles), but others arguing that 
lockdown also has costs and these need to be weighed against the costs of pandemic-
related deaths (consistent with utilitarian principles; see Supplementary Note 2). Those 
who appealed to utilitarian arguments – such as President Donald Trump, who argued 
“we cannot let the cure be worse than the problem itself” 41 and Texas Lieutenant 
Governor Dan Patrick, who suggested that older Americans might be “willing to take a 
chance” on their survival for the sake of their grandchildrens’ economic prospects 42 – 
were met with widespread public outrage 43. Likewise, when leaders in Italy suggested 
prioritizing young and healthy COVID-19 patients over older patients when ventilators 
became scarce, they were intensely criticized by the public 44. Mandatory contact 
tracing policies, which have been proposed on utilitarian grounds, have also faced 
strong public criticisms about infringement of individual rights to privacy 45–47. 
While past research and recent case studies suggest that utilitarian approaches 
to pandemic dilemmas are likely to erode trust in leaders, other evidence suggests this 
conclusion may be premature. First, some work shows that utilitarians are perceived as 
more competent than non-utilitarians 38, and to the extent that trust in leaders is related 
to perceptions of their competence 2, it is possible that utilitarian approaches to 
pandemic dilemmas will increase rather than decrease trust in leaders. Second, 
utilitarianism has at least two distinct dimensions: it permits harming innocent 
individuals to maximize aggregate utility (‘instrumental harm’), and it treats the interests 
of all individuals as equally important (‘impartial beneficence’) 21,33. Indeed, preliminary 
evidence suggests these two dimensions characterize the way ordinary people think 
about moral dilemmas in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic 34. These two 
dimensions of utilitarianism not only are psychologically distinct in the general public 33 
but also have distinct impacts on perception of leaders. Specifically, when people 
endorse (versus reject) utilitarian principles in the domain of instrumental harm they are 
seen as worse political leaders, but in some cases are seen as better political leaders 
when they endorse utilitarian principles in the domain of impartial beneficence 37. 
Another dilemma that pits utilitarian principles against other non-utilitarian 
principles – this time in the domain of impartial beneficence – is whether leaders should 
prioritize their own citizens over people in other countries when allocating scarce 
resources. The utilitarian sole focus on consequences mandates a strict form of 
impartiality: the mere fact that someone is one’s friend (or their mother or fellow citizen) 
does not imply that they have any obligations to such a person that they do not have to 
any and all persons 48. Faced with a decision about whether to help a friend (or family 
member or fellow citizen) or instead provide an equal or slightly larger benefit to a 
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stranger, this strict utilitarian impartiality means that one cannot morally justify favouring 
the person closer to them. In contrast, many non-utilitarian approaches explicitly 
incorporate these notions of special obligations, recognizing the relationships between 
people as morally significant. Here, President Trump went against utilitarian principles 
when he ordered a major company developing personal protective equipment (PPE) to 
stop distributing it to other countries who needed it49, or when he ordered the US 
government to buy up all the global stocks of the COVID-19 treatment remdesivir 50. His 
actions generated outrage across the world and stood in contrast to statements from 
many other Western leaders at the time. The Prime Minister of the UK, Boris Johnson, 
for example, endorsed impartial beneficence when he argued for the imperative to 
“ensure that the world’s poorest countries have the support they need to slow the 
spread of the virus” (June 3rd, 2020) 51. In a similar vein, the Dutch government donated 
50 million euros to the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, an 
organization that aims to distribute vaccines equally across the world 52. 
In sum, public trust in leaders is likely to be a crucial determinant of successful 
pandemic response, and may depend in part on how leaders approach the many moral 
dilemmas that arise during a pandemic. Utilitarian responses to such dilemmas may 
erode or enhance trust relative to non-utilitarian approaches, depending on whether 
they concern instrumental harm or impartial beneficence. Past research on trust and 
utilitarianism is insufficient to understand how utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas 
influence trust during the COVID-19 pandemic – and future crises – for several reasons. 
First, it has relied on highly artificial moral dilemmas, such as the ‘trolley problem’ 53,54, 
that most people have not encountered in their daily lives. Thus, the findings of past 
studies may not generalize to the context of a global health crisis, where everyone 
around the world is directly impacted by the moral dilemmas that arise during a 
pandemic. Second, because the vast majority of previous work on trust in utilitarians 
has focused on instrumental harm, we know little about how impartial beneficence 
impacts trust. Third, most previous work on this topic has focused on trust in ordinary 
people. However, there is evidence that utilitarianism differentially impacts perceptions 
of ordinary people and leaders 37,38,40, which means we cannot generalize from past 
research on trust in utilitarians to a leadership context. Because leaders have power to 
resolve moral dilemmas through policymaking, and therefore can have far more impact 
on the outcomes of public health crises than ordinary people can, it is especially 
important to understand how leaders’ approaches to moral dilemmas impact trust. 
Finally, past work on inferring trust from moral decisions has been conducted in just a 
handful of Western populations – in the United States, Belgium, and Germany – and so 
may not generalize to other countries that are also affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
We need, therefore, to assess cross-cultural stability by testing this hypothesis in 
different countries around the world. Indeed, given observations of cultural variation in 
the willingness to endorse sacrificial harm 32, it is not a foregone conclusion that 
utilitarian decisions will impact trust in leaders universally. For further details of how the 
present work advances our understanding of moral dilemmas and trust in leaders, see 





Figure 1. Overview of Experimental Methods. (A) Regions of recruitment for online 
samples broadly nationally representative with respect to age and gender. KSA, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. UAE, the United Arab Emirates. (B) Running 7-day average 
of new COVID-19 confirmed global infections from January 29th 2020 to March 14th 
2021, with highlighted data collection window (red; from November 26th 2020 to 
December 22nd 2020). Number of COVID-19 confirmed infections were taken from the 
COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at 
Johns Hopkins University 71 (last update March 14th 2021). (C) Summary of the five 
COVID-19 dilemmas employed in the experimental tasks. (D) Voting task: participants 
were asked to vote for a leader who would later be entrusted with a group’s charitable 
donation and be able to ‘embezzle’ some of the donation money for themselves. 
 
 
The goal of the current research is to test the hypothesis that endorsement of 
instrumental harm would decrease trust in leaders while endorsement of impartial 
beneficence would increase trust in leaders, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Testing this hypothesis across a diverse set of 22 countries spanning six continents 
(Figure 1A and Supplementary Figure 1) in November – December 2020, we aim to 
inform how leaders around the globe can communicate with their constituencies in ways 
that will preserve trust during global crises. Given the public health consequences of 
mistrust in leaders 7–9, if our hypothesis is confirmed, leaders may wish to carefully 
consider weighing in publicly on moral dilemmas that are unresolvable with policy, 
because their opinions might erode citizens’ trust in other pronouncements that may be 
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To test our hypothesis empirically, we drew on case studies of public 
communications to identify five moral dilemmas that have been actively debated during 
the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1C). Three of these dilemmas involve instrumental 
harm: the Ventilators dilemma concerns whether younger individuals should be 
prioritized to receive intensive medical care over older individuals when medical 
resources such as ventilators are scarce 23,44, the Lockdown dilemma concerned 
whether to consider reopening schools and the economy or remain in lockdown 23,55, 
and the Tracing dilemma concerned whether it should be mandatory for residents to 
carry devices that continuously trace the wearer’s movements, allowing the government 
to immediately identify people who have potentially been exposed to the coronavirus 45–
47. The other two dilemmas involved impartial beneficence: the PPE dilemma concerned 
whether PPE manufactured within a particular country should be reserved for that 
country’s citizens under conditions of scarcity, or sent where it is most needed 23,56–58, 
and the Medicine dilemma concerned whether a novel COVID-19 treatment developed 
within a particular country should be delivered with priority to that country’s citizens, or 
shared impartially around the world 56,59,60. Participants in our studies read about 
leaders who endorsed either utilitarian or non-utilitarian solutions to the dilemmas (see 
Table 1), and subsequently completed behavioral and self-report measures of trust in 
the respective leaders (see Extended Data Figure 1). For example, some read about a 
leader who endorsed prioritizing younger over older people for scarce ventilators, and 
were then asked how much they trusted that leader. While there are many similar 
dilemmas potentially relevant to the COVID-19 crisis, we chose to focus on the five 
described above because they (1) have been publicly debated at time of writing; and (2) 
apply to all countries in our planned sample. For further details of why we chose these 
specific dilemmas and how they can test our theoretical predictions, see Supplementary 
Notes 2 and 6-9. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of Moral Arguments in COVID-19 Dilemmas 
 
Dilemma Argument Type 
Instrumental 
Harm (IH) Utilitarian Non-Utilitarian 
Lockdown 
“We need to think about all the 
consequences. Preventing deaths 
from COVID isn’t all that matters, 
and continuing these prolonged 
restrictions will have a far worse 
effect on our overall well-being.” 
“As leaders, our primary duty is to 
protect our citizens. We must think of 
our responsibilities to one another, 
and we cannot sacrifice some of our 
most vulnerable people in pursuit of 
the greater good.” 
Ventilators 
“We have to think about how we can 
do the most good with the resources 
we have, and that means prioritizing 
those people who have the best 
“It’s not our place to choose who 
lives. Everyone has the same right to 
receive equal access to treatment, 
and we cannot abandon our most 
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chance of recovering and living a 
long and healthy life.” 
vulnerable in an effort to save more 
lives.” 
Tracing 
“We need to control the pandemic, 
and sometimes you have to sacrifice 
the right to privacy for the greater 
good.” 
“Everyone has a right to privacy, and 
we cannot sacrifice this right in an 
effort to control the pandemic.” 
Impartial 
Beneficence (IB) Utilitarian Non-Utilitarian 
Medicine 
“COVID-19 is a global pandemic that 
affects all humans equally. We need 
to be impartial and send treatment 
where it can achieve the greatest 
good.” 
“We have a right to use our own 
resources to help our own citizens 
before everyone else. Other 
countries can produce their own 
treatments for COVID-19.” 
Personal Protective 
Equipment 
“COVID-19 is a global pandemic that 
affects all humans. We need to be 
impartial in how we distribute 
resources like PPE and send it 
where it can achieve the greatest 
good.” 
“We have a duty to protect our own 
citizens first, not everyone in the 
world. Other countries are 
responsible for protecting their own 




We measured trust in two complementary ways. First, we asked participants to 
self-report their general trust in the leaders, in terms of both an overall character 
judgment (“How trustworthy do you think this person is?”) and how likely they would be 
to trust this person on other issues not related to the dilemma (“How likely would you be 
to trust this person’s advice on other issues?”). Second, we used a novel, incentivized 
voting task designed to measure public trust in leaders (Figure 1D). Following past 
work, we define leaders as people who are responsible for making decisions on behalf 
of a group 61,62. In the voting task, participants were invited to cast a vote to appoint a 
leader who would be responsible for making a charitable donation on behalf of a group. 
Crucially, the leader had the opportunity to ‘embezzle’ some of the donation money for 
themselves. Participants were asked to vote for either a person who endorsed a 
utilitarian or a non-utilitarian position on a COVID-19 dilemma; the person who received 
the most votes would have control over the group’s donation. By measuring preferences 
for a leader who was responsible for a group’s donations to help those in need, the 
voting task captures trust in leaders in a specific context that is highly relevant to our 
central research question: during a health crisis, effective leadership requires 
responsible stewardship of public resources to help those in need. For further details of 
why we designed our trust measures in this way, see Supplementary Notes 10-12. 
Our analyses therefore tested two complementary hypotheses. First, we 
predicted that self-reported trust would be lower for leaders who endorse utilitarian over 
non-utilitarian approaches to dilemmas involving instrumental harm, while the reverse 
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pattern would be observed for impartial beneficence, with greater trust for leaders who 
endorse utilitarian approaches to dilemmas involving impartial beneficence (hypothesis 
1). Second, we predicted that participants would be less likely to vote for leaders who 
endorse utilitarian over non-utilitarian views on dilemmas involving instrumental harm, 
while the reverse pattern would be observed for dilemmas involving impartial 
beneficence (hypothesis 2). Pilot studies conducted in the United States and the United 
Kingdom in July 2020 provided initial support for these hypotheses (see Pilot Data in 
Supplementary Information and Supplementary Figures 2-6 for details). All analyses 
controlled for participants’ demographics and own policy preferences in each dilemma 
(see Table 2). 
Finally, we note that the framing of both the self-report and behavioral measures 
of trust are deliberately unrelated to the pandemic dilemmas we use to highlight the 
moral commitments of the leader. This crucial design choice allowed us to measure the 
impact of utilitarian versus non-utilitarian endorsements of pandemic dilemmas on 
subsequent trust in leaders. In this way, the current design illuminates an important real-
life question: if a leader weighs in publicly on a moral dilemma during a crisis, how likely 
are they to be trusted later on other matters of public concern? 
 
 
Table 2. Design Table 
 



























sample size (N = 
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achieve 95% 
power to detect 
an effect size of 
d = 0.05. 
We will conduct 
a linear mixed-
effects model of 














A significant interaction 
(after following up with 
post hoc tests) will be 
interpreted as evidence 
that endorsement of 
instrumental harm 
decreases general trust in 
leaders while 
endorsement of impartial 
beneficence increases 
general trust in leaders. 
Should the observed effect 
size of the interaction be 
statistically equivalent 
(with the larger of the two 
p values in the TOST 
using equivalence bounds 
set by the SESOI smaller 
than alpha = .05), this will 
be interpreted as evidence 
for null effects. 
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A significant main effect of 
dimension will be interpreted 
as evidence that 
endorsement of instrumental 
harm decreases trusting 
behavior toward leaders, 
while endorsement of 
impartial beneficence 
increases trusting behavior 
toward leaders.  
Should the observed effect 
size be statistically 
equivalent (with the larger of 
the two p values in the 
TOST using equivalence 
bounds set by the SESOI 
smaller than alpha = .05), 
this will be interpreted as 








Donations task. A few days prior to running the main experiment, we recruited a 
convenience sample of donor participants (total N = 100; 58 women, 40 men, 2 with 
another gender identity; mean age 33.95 years) in the United States via Prolific 
(www.prolific.co). The donor participants chose to contribute a total of US$87.89 to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). We displayed this amount to voter 
participants in the main experiment. 
 
Participants. Following the preregistered sampling plan (see Methods), we 
recruited participants via several online survey platforms from November 26th 2020 to 
December 22nd 2020, as new cases of COVID-19 in 2020 were peaking globally 
(Figure 1B). In total, we recruited a sample of 24,809 participants across the following 
countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States (Figure 1A and Supplementary Tables 1 and 2).  
As specified in our preregistered sampling plan (see Methods), participants who 
did not pass the attention checks were screened out immediately prior to beginning the 
survey, but due to platform and institutional review board requirements, participants in 
the United States and the United Kingdom were able to complete the survey even if 
they failed such checks, and so they were excluded post hoc, after data collection (N = 
101 for attention check 1, N = 118 for attention check 2). In addition, participants were 
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excluded according to our exclusion criteria if they (1) took the survey more than once 
(N = 565); (2) reported living in a country different from that of intended recruitment (N = 
96, of which 4 did not answer the question); or (3) failed to answer more than 50% of 
the questions (N = 0). The sample size after applying these exclusion criteria was 
23,929; we then excluded participants from specific analyses if they (4) did not provide 
a response for one of our main dependent variables (N = 177 for self-report, N = 201 for 
voting); or (5) failed the comprehension check for the task being analyzed (see Design; 
N = 6,161 for self-report, N = 11,090 for voting). This resulted in a total final sample of N 
= 17,591 for the self-report task, and N = 12,638 for the voting task. Crucially, the 
comprehension check failure rates were balanced across experimental conditions for 
each task (failure rate for self-report task comprehension check: 25.30% after 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas, Utilitarian argument [final N = 4,499]; 26.08% after 
Instrumental Harm, Non-Utilitarian argument [final N = 4,299]; 25.25% after Impartial 
Beneficence, Utilitarian argument [final N = 4,461]; 27.13% after Impartial Beneficence, 
Non-Utilitarian argument [final N = 4,332]; fail rate for voting task comprehension check: 
46.46% after Instrumental Harm dilemmas [final N = 6,373]; 47.02% after Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas [final N = 6,265]). 
 
Representativeness. As stated in the Stage 1 Report, while we aimed to recruit 
samples broadly representative for age and gender in all countries, we anticipated that it 
would be difficult to obtain fully representative quotas in all countries for some 
demographic categories. To evaluate the representativeness of our samples across age 
and gender categories, we examined the differences between our targeted quotas 
(based on available published population characteristics) and actual quotas in the data, 
separately for each country. We achieved broadly representative samples for gender, 
with most differences between the observed and targeted proportions being less than or 
equal to 5% in all but two countries (Singapore and the United Arab Emirates). Note 
that, because available population data across countries primarily report binary gender 
categories, our estimates of representativeness were not able to account for those 
identifying as non-binary, which is a limitation. Similarly, in 15 countries we obtained 
broadly representative samples for age, with the difference between targeted and actual 
proportions being less than or equal to 5%. In six countries (the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States), older participants were underrepresented in our sample by 6-15%. In 
one country (Germany), older participants were overrepresented by 6% (for details, see 
Supplementary Results; for figures depicting expected versus obtained counts in each 




The main results are depicted in Figures 2-3, across both the self-report and 
behavioral measures, respectively. As predicted, participants showed more trust in 
leaders who endorsed utilitarian views in impartial beneficence dilemmas and less trust 
in leaders who endorsed utilitarian views in instrumental harm dilemmas. This pattern of 
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results was observed for each dilemma (Figures 2B and 3C) and was robust across 
countries (Figures 4A and 4B). Following our preregistered analysis plan (see Analysis 
Plan for Hypothesis Testing), we examined self-report and behavioral measures of trust 
in two separate models, with results passing a corrected alpha of p < .005 being 
interpreted as ‘supportive evidence’ for our hypotheses, and results passing a corrected 
alpha of p < .05 being interpreted as ‘suggestive evidence’ (all the CIs reported below 
are 97.5%). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Self-reported trust. To examine participants’ self-reported trust in 
the leaders, we fitted a linear mixed-effects model of the effect of argument type 
(Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial 
Beneficence), and their interaction, on the composite score of trust, adding 
demographic variables (gender, age, education, subjective socio-economic status 
(SES), political ideology, and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, and 
dilemmas and countries as random intercepts, with participants nested within countries 
(for details, see Analysis Plan for Hypothesis Testing). As specified in Analysis Plan for 
Hypothesis Testing, we also ran a model that included countries as random slopes of 
the two main effects and the interactive effect; the results were consistent with the 
simpler model, but due to convergence issues with the more complex model, we report 
the simpler model. 
We observed a significant main effect of argument type (B = -0.53, SE = 0.02, 
t(17,562) = -24.81, p < .001, CI = [-0.58, -0.48]), no significant main effect of dimension 
type (B = 0.10, SE = 0.10, t(3) = 0.95, p = .408, CI = [-0.15, 0.35]) and, crucially, a 
significant interaction between argument and dimension type (B = 2.12, SE = 0.04, 
t(17,558) = 49.44, p < .001, CI = [2.03, 2.22]). Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni 
corrections confirmed that, in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, utilitarian leaders were seen 
as less trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian leaders = 3.35, 
SE = 0.09, CI = [3.05, 3.65]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders = 4.95, SE = 0.09, CI 
= [4.64, 5.25]; B = -1.60, SE = 0.03, t(17,559) = -52.51, p < .001, CI = [-1.66, -1.53]), but 
in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas this effect was reversed, such that utilitarian leaders 
were seen as more trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian 
leaders = 4.51, SE = 0.10, CI = [4.14, 4.88]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders = 3.98, 
SE = 0.10, CI = [3.61, 4.35]; B = 0.53, SE = 0.03, t(17,560) = 17.41, p < .001, CI = [0.46, 







Figure 2. Self-Reported Trust in Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian Leaders. Average 
trust in utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, (A) with results collapsed across 
Instrumental Harm and Impartial Beneficence dilemmas and (B) separately for each of 
the Instrumental Harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Tracing, and Ventilators) and Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas (PPE and Medicine) in the self-report task (N = 17,591). Non-
utilitarian leaders were seen as more trustworthy than utilitarian leaders for Instrumental 
Harm dilemmas, while the reverse was observed for Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. 
Bars correspond to median scores, lower and upper hinges correspond to the first and 
third quartiles, respectively, and whiskers ends correspond to the most extreme data 
points within 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Voting measure. To examine participants’ trust in the leaders as 
demonstrated by their voting behavior, we fitted a generalized linear mixed-effects 
model with the logit link of the effect of dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial 
Beneficence) on leader choice in the voting task (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), adding 
demographic variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political ideology, and 
religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, and dilemmas and countries as random 
intercepts, with participants nested within countries (for details, see Analysis Plan for 
Hypothesis Testing). This yielded a singular fit, so following our analysis plan, we 
reduced the complexity of the random-effects structure by only including dilemmas and 
countries as random intercepts. As specified in Analysis Plan for Hypothesis Testing, 
we also ran a model that included countries as random slopes of the effect of dimension 
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(both with and without participants nested within countries), we report the simpler 
model.  
We observed a significant main effect for dimension type (B = 1.37, SE = 0.32, z 
= 4.21, p < .001, CI = [0.41, 2.33], odds ratio [OR] = 3.93) such that participants were 
almost 4 times more likely to choose the utilitarian leader in Impartial Beneficence 
dilemmas compared with Instrumental Harm dilemmas. Post hoc comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections confirmed that in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, participants were 
less likely to vote for utilitarian leaders than non-utilitarian leaders (probability of 
choosing utilitarian leader = 0.21, SE = 0.04, CI = [0.13, 0.31]), but in Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas this effect vanished (probability of choosing utilitarian leader = 
0.50, SE = 0.07, CI = [0.34, 0.67]; see Figure 3A; for model estimates, see Figure 3B; 





Figure 3. Voting Choices for Utilitarian and Non-Utilitarian Leaders. (A) Percentage 
of participants who chose to trust utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, separately for 
Instrumental Harm and Impartial Beneficence dilemmas in the voting task (N = 12,638). 
(B) Choices for utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders as estimated from a logit model 
including demographic variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political 
ideology, and religiosity) and policy support as covariates, and dilemmas and countries 
as random intercepts (for details, see Hypothesis 2: Voting measure). (C) Percentage of 
participants who chose to trust utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, separately for 
each of the Instrumental Harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Tracing, and Ventilators) and 
Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (PPE and Medicine). Non-utilitarian leaders were more 
likely to be voted in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, but not in Impartial Beneficence 
dilemmas. Error bars represent standard error of the percentages (A) and (C), and the 
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Based on suggestions that logit and linear models should converge and that 
linear models can in some cases be preferable 63,64, we had also preregistered the 
same analysis using a linear model (instead of a model with the logit link) with the 
identical fixed- and random-effects structures. However, the linear model yielded non-
significant results for the main effect of dimension type with our Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha (B = 0.18, SE = 0.05, t(3) = 3.73, p = .034, CI = [0.07, 0.30]; probability of 
choosing utilitarian leader in Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.30, SE = 0.03, CI = [0.16, 
0.45], in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.49, SE = 0.04, CI = [0.31, 0.67]). This 
discrepancy was unusual, since binomial and linear approaches most often give 
converging results 65,66. Following our preregistered analysis plan, we followed up on 
this non-significant result using the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure to 
differentiate between insensitive versus null results. Given the equivalence bounds set 
by our smallest effect size of interest (SESOI) (ΔL = -0.15 and ΔU = 0.15; see Power 
Analysis section), the effect of dimension on leader choice (a 32% difference) was 
statistically not equivalent to zero (z = 20.77, p = 1.000 for the test with ΔU). This 
analysis, however, does not take into account the covariates specified in the models.  
To resolve the discrepancy between our preregistered binomial and linear 
models, we ran a number of additional exploratory models. These are described in 
Exploratory Analyses and summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Results for Voting Task Models. Voting task results obtained with the 
preregistered models, as well as a variety of exploratory models, including binomial and 
linear models (‘Model Type’) with different specifications of fixed (‘Fixed Effects’) and 
random effects (‘Random Effects’). ‘B’ indicates model coefficients of the effect of moral 
dimension on voting preference, ‘p’ indicates significance value, and ‘Predicted 
Difference’ indicates the expected difference in votes for utilitarian leaders in Impartial 
Beneficence versus Instrumental Harm dilemmas. 
 









Dilemma 1.37 <.001 0.32 
Linear 




Dilemma 0.18 .034 0.18 
Exploratory Models 
Binomial Dimension None 1.37 <.001 0.32 
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Linear Dimension None 0.32 <.001 0.32 
Binomial 
Six demographics  
Support 
Dimension 
None 1.34 <.001 0.31 
Linear 
Six demographics  
Support 
Dimension 
None 0.19 <.001 0.19 
Linear with 
Robust SEs 
Six demographics  
Support 
Dimension 
Country 0.19 <.001 0.19 
Binomial 




None 1.34 <.001 0.32 
Linear 








Robustness checks. Following our analysis plan, we verified the robustness of 
our findings in several ways. First, due to the changes in country-specific lockdown 
policies that were implemented between preregistration and data collection, we ran a 
variation of our models which omitted the Lockdown dilemma. The results were 
substantially unchanged, both for the self-report task (interaction between argument and 
dimension type: B = 2.26, SE = 0.05, t(17,640) = 48.56, p < .001, CI = [2.16, 2.37]) and 
the voting task (main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.29, SE = 0.39, z 
= 3.33, p < .001, CI = [0.06, 2.52], OR = 3.63) tasks.  
In addition, because some countries had already implemented mandatory 
contact tracing schemes at the time of data collection, we ran a variation of our models 
in those countries only (namely China, India, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea) with 
and without the Tracing dilemma. The results in those countries were similar when 
including and omitting the Tracing dilemma from the analysis, both for the self-report 
task (Tracing included: interaction between argument and dimension type: B = 1.13, SE 
= 0.10, t(3,267) = 11.62, p < .001, CI = [0.91, 1.35]; Tracing excluded: interaction 
between argument and dimension type: B = 1.55, SE = 0.10, t(3,266) = 14.86, p < .001, 
CI = [1.32, 1.78]) and voting task (Tracing included: main effect for dimension type in 
binomial model: B = 0.98, SE = 0.36, z = 2.70, p = .007, CI = [-0.09, 2.07], OR = 2.67; 
Tracing excluded: main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.32, SE = 
0.14, z = 9.26, p < .001, CI = [0.88, 1.78], OR = 3.74). Finally, we also checked that the 
results in these countries were robust to order effects (i.e., regardless of whether 
participants had seen the tracing dilemma prior to other dilemmas). To do this, we 
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analyzed participants’ responses with an additional covariate indicating whether the 
participant had seen the tracing dilemma in the prior task. Again, the results were 
substantially unchanged both for the self-report task (interaction between argument and 
dimension type: B = 1.13, SE = 0.10, t(3,266) = 11.62, p < .001, CI = [0.91, 1.35]) and 
the voting task (main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.11, SE = 0.37, z 




Additional models for voting task. As noted above, our main preregistered 
analysis for the voting task was a generalized linear mixed-effects model with the logit 
link of the effect of dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial Beneficence) on the 
leader choice (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), with demographics and participants’ own 
policy preferences as fixed effects, and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts 
(Table 2). This analysis confirmed our predictions, but we had also preregistered the 
same analysis using a linear model (instead of logit link) with the identical fixed and 
random effects structure. As described above, the results from this model did not pass 
our preregistered Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold. This discrepancy was 
unusual, given prior reports that linear and binomial models yield identical results in the 
vast majority of cases 63,66. As a first check on this discrepancy, we assessed the fits of 
the binomial and linear models by fitting each with half the data, and predicting the 
leader choices in the remaining half. The mean difference between the predicted and 
observed values was lower in the binomial model (mean error = 0.25) compared with 
the linear model (mean error = 0.27; t(6,318) = -32.53, p < .001), suggesting the 
binomial model is a better fit to our data. 
Next, we ran a series of follow-up analyses to supplement our preregistered, 
theoretically informed models. There are a variety of opinions for how to best level 
complex nested binary data like ours. For example, while random effects aid 
generalizability 67, some advocate for modeling country variables as fixed rather than 
random effects to prevent increases in model bias 68,69 or overly complex random-
effects structures 70. Moreover, while controlling for demographic variables is important 
for generalizability of our findings, some advocate for minimal use of covariates to 
prevent type 1 error inflation 71. Due to the discrepancy in the theoretically justified 
models we had preregistered, and ongoing debates over the specifications of modelling 
such complex data, we ran a variety of models (described in detail in the Supplementary 
Results and summarized in Table 3) with different link functions and different 
specifications of fixed and random effects, as well as robust random effects and 
randomization inference. Overall, all models led to the same conclusion: participants 
voted for the non-utilitarian leader more than the utilitarian leader in dilemmas about 
instrumental harm, but the reverse in impartial beneficence dilemmas, with the utilitarian 
leader trusted more than the non-utilitarian leader – suggesting that the discrepancy 




Effects by country. To explore cross-cultural variation in trust in utilitarian versus 
non-utilitarian leaders, we ran additional models with country as a random slope and 
extracted the coefficients of interest (Figures 4A and 4B). For the self-report task, we 
conducted a linear mixed-effects model of the effect of argument type (Utilitarian vs. 
Non-Utilitarian), dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial Beneficence), and 
their interaction, on the composite score of trust, adding demographic variables (gender, 
age, education, subjective SES, political ideology, and religiosity) and policy support as 
fixed effects, and countries as a random slope of the interactive effect of argument and 
dimension. First, we confirmed that there was a significant interaction between 
argument and dimension type (B = 2.08, SE = 0.16, t(21) = 13.08, p < .001, CI = [1.71, 
2.45]), consistent with our preregistered model. Next, we extracted the interaction 
coefficients for each country, as well as the standard errors of the coefficients, with the 
estimates plotted in Figure 4A. While there were some variations in the effect sizes, the 
results were remarkably consistent across countries. The predicted pattern of results 
was observed in all 22 countries with Israel, South Korea, and China showing the 
smallest effects, and Brazil, the UAE, and Norway showing the largest effects. 
For the voting task, we conducted a generalized linear mixed-effects model with 
the logit link of the effect of dimension type (Instrumental Harm versus Impartial 
Beneficence) on leader choice (Utilitarian versus Non-Utilitarian), adding demographic 
variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political ideology, and religiosity) and 
policy support as fixed effects, and countries as a random slope of dimension. First, we 
confirmed there was a significant main effect for dimension type (B = 1.34, SE = 0.07, z 
= 17.88, p < .001, CI = [1.16, 1.51], OR = 3.81), as in our preregistered model. Next, we 
extracted the coefficients for each country, as well as the standard errors of the 
coefficients, and exponentiated them to get the odds ratios, with the resulting estimates 
plotted in Figure 4B. Again, the results were remarkably consistent with the predicted 
pattern of results seen across all 22 countries with China, Israel, and Canada showing 
the smallest effects and Norway, the UAE, and the United States showing the largest 
effect size. 
 
Correlations between self-report and behavioral measures across countries. The 
self-report and behavioral tasks employed in the current study are highly 
complementary in several ways: for example, the former is more generalizable across 
different situations, while the latter is incentivized and more concrete (see 
Supplementary Note 10 for further details). To ensure that despite their superficial 
differences the tasks targeted the same construct, i.e. trust in leaders, and measured 
robust preferences across countries, we checked that the effects of moral arguments 
and utilitarian dimensions on these measures were correlated across countries. Indeed, 
we found that the coefficients of the interaction between moral argument and moral 
dimension on trust in the self-report task were significantly correlated with the effect of 






Figure 4. Trust in Leaders by Country as Measured by the Self-Report and Voting 
Tasks. (A) Predicted effect of moral dimension (Instrumental Harm versus Impartial 
Beneficence) and argument (Utilitarian versus Non-Utilitarian) on trust in the self-report 
task (N = 17,591) for each country and overall. Dots represent model coefficients 
extracted from a model including country as a random slope of the interactive effect of 
moral dimension and argument (see Exploratory Analyses); error bars represent 
standard errors of the model coefficients. (B) Odds ratio of the effect of moral dimension 
(Instrumental Harm versus Impartial Beneficence) on trust for the utilitarian versus non-
utilitarian leader in the voting task (N = 12,638) for each country and overall. Dots 
represent odds ratios extracted from a model including country as a random slope of 
moral dimension (see Exploratory Analyses); error bars represent exponentiated 
standard errors of the model coefficients. (C) Correlation between the country-level 
effect size estimates in the self-report task (x axis; also depicted in [A] and voting task (y 
axis; also depicted in [B]). US, the United States; UK, the United Kingdom; UAE, the 
United Arab Emirates; KSA, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
Effects of participant exclusions in voting task. The main analyses reported 
above were performed on a subset of participants who passed the comprehension 
checks, as per our preregistered sampling plan (criterion 5; see Sampling Plan). For the 
voting task, the observed pass rate (53.26%) was lower than the preregistered expected 
pass rate (60%), suggesting that the comprehension check may have been overly 
stringent. Therefore, we conducted additional analyses to explore whether this 
preregistered exclusion criterion might have affected the generalizability of our results 
across the study population in terms of education level.   
Participants who failed the voting task comprehension check reported slightly 
lower educational attainment on average (mean = 5.32, SE = 1.39, CI = [5.30, 5.35]) 
than those who passed the comprehension check (mean = 5.42, SE = 1.37, CI = [5.40, 
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preregistered models when including participants who failed the voting task 
comprehension check (main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.26, SE = 
0.28, z = 4.55, p < .001, CI = [0.44, 2.08], OR = 3.53; main effect for dimension type in 




The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a number of moral dilemmas that engender 
conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles. Building on past work 
on utilitarianism and trust, we tested the hypothesis that endorsement of utilitarian 
solutions to pandemic dilemmas would impact trust in leaders. Specifically, in line with 
suggestions from previous work and case studies of public communications during the 
early stages of the pandemic, we predicted that endorsing instrumental harm would 
decrease trust in leaders, while endorsing impartial beneficence would increase trust. 
Experiments conducted during November – December 2020 in 22 countries across six 
continents (total N = 23,929; valid sample for self-report task = 17,591; valid sample for 
behavioral task = 12,638) provided robust support for our hypothesis. In the context of 
five realistic pandemic dilemmas, participants reported lower trust in leaders who 
endorsed instrumental sacrifices for the greater good, and higher trust in leaders who 
advocated for impartially maximizing the welfare of everyone equally. In a behavioral 
measure of trust, only 28% of participants preferred to vote for a utilitarian leader who 
endorsed instrumental harm, while 60% voted for an impartially beneficent utilitarian 
leader. These findings were robust to controlling for a variety of demographic 
characteristics as well as participants’ own policy preferences regarding the dilemmas. 
Although we observed some variation in effect sizes across the countries we sampled, 
the overall pattern of results was highly robust across countries. Our results suggest 
that endorsing utilitarian approaches to moral dilemmas can both erode and enhance 
trust in leaders across the globe, depending on the type of utilitarian morality. 
We designed our set of dilemmas to rule out several alternative explanations for 
our findings, such as a general preference for less restrictive leaders (see 
Supplementary Note 7), leaders who treat everyone equally (see Supplementary Note 
8), and leaders who seek to minimize COVID-19 related deaths (see Supplementary 
Note 9). In addition, all of our results survived planned robustness checks to account for 
the possibility that local policies related to lockdowns or contact tracing could bias 
participants’ responses. Post hoc analyses demonstrated that our findings were highly 
consistent across the different dilemmas for instrumental harm (Lockdown, Tracing, and 
Ventilators) and impartial beneficence (Medicine and PPE).  
While the robustness of our findings across countries speaks to their broad 
cultural generalizability, further work is needed to understand the observed variations in 
effect sizes across countries. It seems plausible that both economic (for example, gross 
domestic product or socio-economic inequality) and cultural (for example, social 
network structure) differences across countries could explain some of the observed 
variations. One possibility, for example, is that country-level variations in tightness-
looseness 72, which have been associated with countries’ success in limiting cases in 
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the COVID-19 pandemic 73, might moderate the effects of moral arguments on trust in 
leaders. Another direction for future research could be to explore how country-level 
social network structure might influence our results. Individuals in countries with a 
higher kinship index 74 and a more family-oriented social network structure, for example, 
might be less likely to trust utilitarian leaders, especially when the utilitarian solution 
conflicts with more local moral obligations.  
There are several important limitations to the generalizability of our findings. 
First, although our samples were broadly nationally representative for age and gender 
(with some exceptions; see Results), we did not assess representativeness of our 
samples on a number of other factors including education, income, and geographic 
location. Second, while our results do concord with the limited existing research 
examining the effects of endorsing instrumental harm and impartial beneficence on 
perceived suitability as a leader 37, and held across different examples of our pandemic-
specific dilemmas, it of course remains possible that different results would be seen 
when judging leaders’ responses in other types of crises (for example, violent conflicts, 
natural disasters, or economic crises), or at different stages of a crisis (for example, at 
the beginning versus later stages). Third, the reported experiments tested how 
responses to moral dilemmas influenced trust in anonymous, hypothetical political 
leaders. In the real world, however, people form and update impressions of known 
leaders with a history of political opinions and behaviors, and it is plausible that 
inferences of trustworthiness depend not just on a leader’s recent decisions but also on 
their history of behavior, just as classic work on impression formation shows that the 
same information can lead to different impressions depending on prior knowledge about 
the target person 75. Furthermore, we did not specify the gender of the leaders in our 
experiments (except in the voting task for China and for the Hebrew and Arabic 
translations, where it is not possible to indicate ‘leader’ without including a gendered 
pronoun; here it was translated in the masculine form). Past work conducted in the 
United States suggests that participants may default to an assumption that the leader is 
a man 76, but it will be important for future work to assess whether men and women 
leaders are judged differentially for their moral decisions. Because women are typically 
stereotyped as being warmer and more communal than men 77, it is plausible that 
women leaders would face more backlash for making ‘cold’ utilitarian decisions, 
especially in the domain of instrumental harm. Fourth, because the current work 
focused on trust in political leaders, it remains unclear how utilitarianism would impact 
trust in people who occupy other social roles, such as medical workers or ordinary 
citizens. Fifth, and finally, it could be interesting to explore further the connection 
between impartial beneficence and intergroup psychology, especially with regards to 
teasing apart ‘impartiality’ and ‘beneficence’. For example, even holding beneficence 
constant, a leader who advocates for impartially sharing resources with a rival country 
may be perceived differently from one who impartially shares with an allied country 
(and, while speculative, this distinction might explain why Israel was an outlier in 
impartial beneficence, being a country in a region with ongoing local conflicts). 
Our results have clear implications for how leaders’ responses to moral dilemmas 
can impact how they are trusted. In times of global crisis, such as the COVID-19 
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pandemic, leaders will necessarily face real, urgent, and serious dilemmas. Faced with 
such dilemmas, decisions have to be made – and our findings suggest that how leaders 
make these judgments can have important consequences, not just for whether they are 
trusted on the issue in question but also more generally. Importantly, this will be the 
case even when the leader has little direct control over the resolution. While a national 
leader (for example, a president or prime minister) has the power and responsibility to 
resolve some moral dilemmas with policy decisions, not all political leaders (e.g., as in 
our study, local mayors) have that power. A leader with little ability to directly impact the 
resolution of a moral dilemma might consider that voicing an opinion on that dilemma 
could reduce their credibility on other issues that they have more power to control. 
To conclude, we investigated how trust in leaders is sensitive to how they resolve 
conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas 
during a global pandemic. Our results provide robust evidence that utilitarian responses 
to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: advocating for sacrificing 
some people to save many others (i.e., instrumental harm) reduces trust, while arguing 
that we ought to impartially maximize the welfare of everyone equally (i.e., impartial 
beneficence) increases trust. Our work advances understanding of trust in political 
leaders, and shows that across a variety of cultures it depends not just on whether they 
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Overview. An overview of the experiment is depicted in Extended Data Figure 1. 
After selecting their language, providing their consent, and passing two attention 
checks, participants were told that they would “read about three different debates that 
are happening right now around the world”, that they would be given “some of the 
justifications that politicians and experts are giving for different policies”, and that they 
would be “ask[ed] some questions about [their] opinions”. They then completed two 
tasks measuring their trust in leaders expressing either utilitarian or non-utilitarian 
opinions (one using a behavioral measure and one using self-report measures, 
presented in a randomized order); these tasks were followed by questions about their 
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impressions about the ongoing pandemic crisis, as well as individual difference and 
demographic measures, as detailed below. Data collection was performed blind to the 
conditions of the participants.  
Both behavioral and self-report measures of trust involved five debates on the 
current pandemic crisis, three of which involved instrumental harm (IH), and two 
impartial beneficence (IB) (summarized in Figure 1C and Table 1; for full text, see 
Supplementary Methods). Each of these five dilemmas were based on real debates that 
have been occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic, and we developed the 
philosophical components of each argument in consultation with moral philosophers. 
 
1) Lockdown (Instrumental Harm): whether the country should maintain 
severe restrictions on social gatherings until a vaccine is developed to 
prevent COVID-related deaths, or consider relaxing restrictions to 
maximize overall well-being  
2) Ventilators (Instrumental Harm): whether doctors should give everyone 
equal access to COVID treatment, or prioritize younger and healthier 
people  
3) Tracing (Instrumental Harm): whether the government should make it 
mandatory for residents to wear contact tracing devices to prevent 
pandemic spread, or make tracing devices optional to respect residents’ 
right to privacy 
4) Medicine (Impartial Beneficence): whether medicine developed in the 
home country should be reserved for treating the home country’s citizens, 
or sent wherever it can do the most good, even if that means sending it to 
other countries  
5) PPE (Impartial Beneficence): whether PPE manufactured in the home 
country should be reserved for protecting the home country’s citizens, or 
sent wherever it can do the most good, even if that means sending it to 
other countries  
 
See Supplementary Notes 2 and 6-9 for further details of why we chose these specific 
dilemmas and how they can test our theoretical predictions. 
 
Translations. Where the survey was administered in a non-English-speaking 
country, study materials were translated following a standard forward- and back-
translation procedure 78. First, for forward translation, a native speaker translated 
materials from English to the target language. Second, for back translation, a second 
native translator (who had not seen the original English materials) translated the 
materials back into English. Results were then compared, and if there were any 
substantial discrepancies, a second forward- and back-translation was conducted with 
translators working in tandem to resolve issues. Finally, the finished translated and 
back-translated materials were checked by researchers coordinating the experiment for 
that country.  
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Experimental design. Participants were randomly and blindly assigned to one of 
4 conditions in the beginning of the experiment. These conditions corresponded to a 
2x2 between-subjects design: 2 (moral dimension in the voting task: Instrumental Harm 
or Impartial Beneficence) x 2 (argument in the self-report task: Utilitarian or Non-
Utilitarian). In addition, we randomized the order of tasks (voting or self-report task first), 
the order of arguments in the voting task (Utilitarian or Non-Utilitarian first), the order of 
dilemmas in the self-report task (Lockdown, Ventilators, or Tracing first if Instrumental 
Harm, and PPE or Medicine first if Impartial Beneficence), and the dilemmas displayed 
(two in the self-report task and one in the voting task randomly chosen among 
Lockdown, Ventilators, and Tracing if Instrumental Harm, and PPE and Medicine if 
Impartial Beneficence). This design allowed us to minimize demand characteristics with 
between-subjects manipulations of key experimental factors, while at the same time 
maximizing efficiency of data collection. 
 
Attention checks. We included two attention checks prior to the beginning of the 
experiment. Any participants who failed either of these were then screened out 
immediately. First, participants were told: 
 
“In studies like ours, there are sometimes a few people who do not carefully read 
the questions they are asked and just ‘quickly click through the survey.’ These 
random answers are problematic because they compromise the results of the 
studies. It is very important that you pay attention and read each question. In 
order to show that you read our questions carefully (and regardless of your own 
opinion), please answer ‘TikTok’ in the question on the next page” 
 
Then, on the next page, participants were given a decoy question: “When an 
important event is happening or is about to happen, many people try to get informed 
about the development of the situation. In such situations, where do you get your 
information from?”. Participants were asked to select among the following possible 
answers, displayed in a randomized order: TikTok, TV, Twitter, Radio, Reddit, 
Facebook, Youtube, Newspapers, Other. Participants who failed to follow our 
instructions and selected any answer other than the instructed one (“TikTok”) were then 
screened out of the survey. Second, participants were asked to read a short paragraph 
about the history and geography of roses. On the following page, they were asked to 
indicate which of six topics was not discussed in the paragraph. Participants who 
answered incorrectly were then screened out of the survey (with the exception of those 
who participated via Prolific, who were instead allowed to continue due to platform 
requirements). 
 
Dilemma introduction. Both the voting and self-report tasks began with an 
introduction to a specific dilemma. In the voting task, participants viewed a single 
dilemma, and in the self-report task, participants viewed two dilemmas in randomized 
order (see Extended Data Figure 1 for details). No participant saw the same dilemma in 
both the voting and self-report tasks.  
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The dilemma introduction consisted of a short description of the dilemma (for 
example, in the PPE dilemma: “Imagine that [...] there will soon be another global 
shortage of personal protective equipment [... and] political leaders are debating how 
personal protective equipment should be distributed around the globe.”), followed by a 
description of two potential policies (for example, in the PPE dilemma, US participants 
read: “[S]ome are arguing that PPE made in American factories should be sent 
wherever it can do the most good, even if that means sending it to other countries. 
Others are arguing that PPE made in American factories should be kept in the U.S., 
because the government should focus on protecting its own citizens.”).  
After reading about the dilemma, participants were asked to provide their own 
opinion about the best course of action (“Which policy do you think should be 
adopted?”), answered on a 1-7 scale, with the endpoints (1 and 7) representing strong 
preferences for one of the policies (for example, in the PPE dilemma they were labeled 
“Strongly support U.S.-made PPE being reserved for protecting American citizens” and 
“Strongly support U.S.-made PPE being given to whoever needs it most”, respectively), 
and the midpoint (4) representing indifference (“Indifferent”). See Supplementary Note 
13 for further details. As an exploratory measure that is not analyzed for the purposes of 
the current report, participants also indicated how morally wrong it would be for 
politicians to endorse the utilitarian approach in each dilemma.  
For full text of dilemmas and introduction questions, see Supplementary 
Methods.  
 
Voting task. Our behavioral measure of trust in the current studies is based on a 
novel task with two types of participants: voters and donors. Voters were asked to cast 
a vote for a leader who would be responsible for making a charitable donation to 
UNICEF on behalf of a group of donors, and would have the opportunity to ‘embezzle’ 
some of the donation money for themselves (Figure 1D).  
We collected data from donors first. A few days before we ran our main 
experiment, a convenience sample of US participants (N = 100) was recruited from 
Prolific and was provided with a US$2 bonus endowment. They were given the 
opportunity to donate up to their full bonus to UNICEF. After making their donation 
decision, they read about the five COVID-19 dilemmas, in randomized order, and 
indicated which policy they thought should be adopted. Finally, they were instructed that 
they might be selected to be responsible for the entire group’s donations to UNICEF. 
Participants were told that if they were selected, they would have the opportunity to 
keep up to the full amount of total group donations for themselves, and were asked to 
indicate how much of the group’s donations they would keep for themselves if they were 
selected to be responsible.  
Our main experiment focused on the behavior of voter participants. In the voting 
task, participants were randomly assigned to read about one dilemma, randomly 
selected amongst the five dilemmas summarised in Table 1. After completing the 
dilemma introduction, participants were asked to “make a choice that has real financial 
consequences” and told that “[a] few days ago, a group of 100 people were recruited via 
an international online marketplace and invited to make donations to the charitable 
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organization UNICEF. In total, they donated an amount equivalent to $87.89”. We 
instructed participants that we would like them to “vote for a leader to be responsible for 
the entire group’s donations”. Crucially, they were also told that “[t]he leader has two 
options: They can transfer the group’s $87.89 donation to UNICEF in full, or [t]hey can 
take some of this money for themselves (up to the full amount) and transfer whatever 
amount is left to UNICEF”. The exact donation amount was determined by the actual 
donation choices of the donor participants. 
Following these details, participants were asked to cast a vote for the leadership 
position between two people who had also read about the same dilemma they had just 
read about. Participants were instructed that one person agreed with the utilitarian 
argument, while the other person agreed with the non-utilitarian argument. This 
information was displayed to participants on the same page, in a randomized order. 
Participants were then asked to vote for the person they wished to be responsible for 
the group’s donations. We instructed participants that we would later identify the winner 
of the election, and implement their choice by distributing payments to the leader and 
UNICEF accordingly.  
 After completing the voting task, voter participants were asked the following 
comprehension question: “In the last page, you were asked to choose a leader that will 
be entrusted with the group’s donation. Please select the option that best describes 
what the leader will be able to do with the donation”. They were asked to select between 
three options, displayed in randomized order: 
 
1. The leader can transfer the full donation to UNICEF or take some of the 
money for themselves. 
2. The leader is not able to do anything with the donation. 
3. The leader chooses how much of the group’s donation to keep for 
themselves and how much to return to the people who donated the 
money. 
 
We excluded voter participants who failed to select the correct answer (1), as per 
our exclusion criteria (see Exclusions). Note that in our stage 1 Registered Report the 
answer choices were slightly different, but we revised them after discovering in a soft 
launch that participants were systematically choosing one of the incorrect options, 
suggesting that the question was poorly worded. In consultation with the editor, we 
clarified the response options and began the data collection procedure anew. This was 
one of only three deviations from the stage 1 report (the others being that data 
collection took four weeks instead of the two weeks we had anticipated, and the use of 
Prolific instead of Lucid for recruitment in the United Kingdom and the United States). 
After collecting the votes from the voter participants, we randomly selected ten 
donor participants to be considered for the leadership position: one who endorsed the 
utilitarian position for each of the five dilemmas and one who endorsed the non-
utilitarian position for each of the five dilemmas. After tallying the votes from voter 
participants, we implemented the choices of each of the elected leaders and made the 
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payments accordingly. For full text of instructions and questions for both the donor and 
the voting task, see Supplementary Methods. 
 
Self-reported trust. Participants read about two dilemmas on the dimension of 
utilitarianism that they did not encounter in the voting task. That is, participants assigned 
to an Instrumental Harm dilemma (Lockdown, Ventilators, or Tracing) for the voting task 
read both Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (PPE and Medicine) for the self-report task, 
while participants assigned to an Impartial Beneficence dilemma (PPE or Medicine) for 
the voting task read a randomly assigned two out of three Instrumental Harm dilemmas 
(Lockdown, Ventilators, and Tracing) for the self-report task. The structure of the 
introduction to the dilemmas was identical to that in the voting task: they read a short 
description of the issue, followed by a description of two potential policies. On separate 
screens, they were asked which policy they themselves support. 
After providing their own opinions, participants were asked to imagine that the 
mayor of a major city in their region was arguing for one of the two policies, providing 
either a utilitarian or non-utilitarian argument. Each participant was randomly assigned 
to read about leaders making either utilitarian or non-utilitarian arguments in both 
dilemmas presented in the self-report task. After reading about the leader’s opinion and 
argument, they were then be asked to report their general trust in the leader (“How 
trustworthy do you think this person is?”), to be answered on a 1-7 scale, with labels 
“Not at all trustworthy”, “Somewhat trustworthy”, and “Extremely trustworthy” at points 1, 
4, and 7, respectively. On a separate page they were then asked to report their trust in 
the leader’s advice on other issues (“How likely would you be to trust this person’s 
advice on other issues?”), to be answered on a 1-7 scale, with labels “Not at all likely”, 
“Somewhat likely”, and “Extremely likely” at points 1, 4, and 7, respectively. 
After completing the self-report task, participants were asked the following 
comprehension question: “In the last page, you read about a mayor in a city in your 
region, and were asked about them. Please select the option that best describes the 
questions you were asked”. Their options, displayed in a randomized order, were: (1) 
“How much I agreed with the mayor”; (2) “How much I trusted the mayor”; and (3) “How 
much I admired the mayor”. This allowed us to exclude participants who failed to select 
the correct answer (2), as per our exclusion criteria (see Exclusions). 
For full text of instructions and questions for the self-report task, see 
Supplementary Methods. 
 
COVID concern. To assess their attitudes toward and experience with the 
pandemic, participants were asked three questions. Two measured how concerned 
participants currently felt about the pandemic, on both health-related and economic 
grounds (“How concerned are you about the health-related consequences of the 
COVID-19 pandemic?” and “How concerned are you about the financial and economic 
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic?”, both to be answered on a 1-7 scale, with 
labels “Not at all” and “Very much” at points 1 and 7, respectively). The third question 
measured their personal involvement (“Have you or anyone else you know personally 
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suffered significant health consequences as a result of COVID-19?”, to be answered by 
selecting one of three options: “Yes”, “No”, and “Unsure”). 
 
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. All participants then completed the Oxford 
Utilitarianism Scale 33. The scale consists of nine items in two subscales: instrumental 
harm (OUS-IH) and impartial beneficence (OUS-IB). The OUS-IB subscale consists of 
five items that measure endorsement of impartial maximization of the greater good, 
even at great personal cost (e.g., “It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t 
really need if one can donate it to causes that provide effective help to those who will 
benefit a great deal”). The OUS-IH subscale consists of four items relating to willingness 
to cause harm so as to bring about the greater good (e.g., “It is morally right to harm an 
innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent 
people”). Participants viewed all questions in a randomized order, and answered on a 1-
7 scale, with labels “Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, “Somewhat disagree”, “Neither 
agree nor disagree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Agree”, and “Strongly agree”. 
 
Demographics. All participants were asked to report their gender, age, years 
spent in education, subjective SES, education (on the same scale, but with minor 
changes in the scale labels across countries), political ideology (using an item from the 
World Values Survey), and religiosity. These questions were the same across countries 
and represent the demographics used as covariates in the main analyses. Additionally, 
participants were asked to indicate their region of residence (for example, for the United 
States, “Which US State do you currently live in?”), and ethnicity/race, with the specific 
wording and response options depending on the local context (in France and Germany, 
this was not collected due to local regulations). In addition, participants were asked to 
confirm their country of residence, which allowed us to exclude participants who 
reported living in a country different from that of intended recruitment, as per our 
exclusion criteria (see Exclusions).  
 
Debriefing questions. Finally, participants were asked a series of debriefing 
questions. Two of these assessed their participation in other COVID-related studies 
(“Approximately how many COVID-related studies have you participated in before this 
one?”, answered by selecting one of the following options: “0”, “1-5”, “6-10”, “11-20”, 
“21-50”, “More than 50”, and “I don’t remember”; and “If you have participated in any 
other COVID-related studies, how similar were they to this one?”, to be answered by 
selecting one of the following options: “Extremely similar”, “Very similar”, “Moderately 
similar”, “Slightly similar”, “Not at all similar”, and “Not applicable”).  
An additional question assessed participants’ attitudes towards the charity 
involved in the voting task (“How reliable do you think UNICEF is as an organization in 
using donations for helping people?”, answered on a 1-5 scale, with labels “Not reliable 





Analysis Plan: Pre-processing 
 
Exclusions. We planned to exclude data either at the participant level as outlined 
in the Sampling Plan section, based on criteria 1 (duplicate response), 2 (different 
residence), and 3 (partial completion), or on an analysis-by-analysis basis as outlined in 
criteria 4 (missing variables) and 5 (failed comprehension checks).  
 
Outliers. All participants’ responses were analyzed, regardless of whether they 
were statistical outliers. 
 
Computation of composite measures. Composite measures of self-reported trust 
were created by averaging responses to the two trust questions (trustworthiness of the 
leader, and trust in the leader’s advice on other issues), separately for each participant 
and dilemma. In addition, we created composite OUS scores for each participant by 
averaging their responses on the scale items, separately for the Instrumental Harm (4 
items) and Impartial Beneficence subscales (5 items). 
 
Analysis Plan for Hypothesis Testing 
 
 We planned to examine behavioral measures and self-report measures of trust in 
two separate models. For testing our hypotheses across all countries, we set a 
significance threshold of alpha = .0025 (Bonferroni corrected for two tests). All analyses 
were conducted in R using the packages lme4 79, lmerTest 80, estimatr 81, emmeans 82, 
ggeffects 83, ri2 84, and glmnet 85. We planned that, in the event of convergence or 
singularity issues, we would supplement the theoretically appropriate models described 
below with simplified models by reducing the complexity of the random-effects structure 
86.  
  
Hypothesis 1: Self-reported trust. To examine participants’ self-reported trust in 
the leaders, we planned to examine the composite measure of their trust in each leader 
(i.e. the average of the two trust questions, computed separately for each participant 
and dilemma). We hypothesized that participants would report higher trust in non-
utilitarian leaders compared with utilitarian leaders in the context of dilemmas involving 
instrumental harm, while the opposite pattern would be observed for impartial 
beneficence. To test this hypothesis, we planned to conduct a linear mixed-effects 
model of the effect of argument type (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), dimension type 
(Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial Beneficence), and their interaction, on the composite 
score of trust, adding demographic variables (namely gender, age, education, 
subjective SES, political ideology, and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, 
and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts, with participants nested within 
countries. In addition, we planned to run a model that included countries as random 
slopes of the two main effects and the interactive effect. We said that, should the model 
converge, and should the results differ from the simpler model proposed above, we 
would compare model fits using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and retain the 
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model that better fits the data – while still reporting the other in supplementary 
materials. We planned to follow up on significant effects with post hoc comparisons 
using Bonferroni corrections. For the purposes of the analysis, we used effect coding 
such that for argument type, the Non-Utilitarian condition was coded as -0.5 and the 
Utilitarian condition as 0.5, and for the dimension type, Instrumental Harm was coded as 
-0.5, and Impartial Beneficence as 0.5. The demographic covariates were grand-mean-
centered; the gender variable was dummy coded with “woman” as baseline. P values 
were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom as 
implemented in lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Voting measure. To examine participants’ trust in the leaders as 
demonstrated by their behavior, we planned to examine their choices in the voting task, 
where they were asked to select which of two leaders (one making a utilitarian 
argument, and the other a non-utilitarian one) to entrust with a group charity donation. 
We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to select the non-utilitarian 
leader over the utilitarian leader when reading about their arguments for dilemmas 
involving instrumental harm, while the opposite pattern would be observed for impartial 
beneficence. To test this hypothesis, we planned to conduct a generalized linear mixed-
effects model with the logit link of the effect of dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. 
Impartial Beneficence) on the leader choice (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), adding 
demographic variables (namely gender, age, education, subjective SES, political 
ideology, and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, and dilemmas and 
countries as random intercepts, with participants nested within countries. In addition, we 
said we would also run a model that includes countries as random slopes of the effect of 
dimension type. Should the model converge, and should the results differ from the 
simpler model proposed above, we planned to compare model fits using the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), and retain the model that better fits the data – while still 
reporting the other in supplementary materials. Based on recent reports that linear 
models might be preferable to logistic models in treatment designs 63,64, we said we 
would run the same analysis using a linear model (instead of logit link) with the identical 
fixed and random effects and again adjudicate between the models using the AIC. We 
planned to follow up on any significant effects observed with post hoc comparisons 
using Bonferroni corrections. For the purposes of this analysis, we planned to use effect 
coding such that for the binary response variable of argument type, the Non-Utilitarian 
trust response was coded as 0 and the Utilitarian trust response as 1, and for the 
dimension type, Instrumental Harm was coded as -0.5, and Impartial Beneficence as 
0.5. Again, the demographic covariates were grand-mean-centered; the gender variable 
was dummy coded with “woman” as baseline. P values were computed using 
Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom as implemented in lmerTest. For 
analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/. 
 
Robustness checks. Because there was evidence that public perceptions of 
lockdowns at the time of data collection were changing relative to July 2020 when we 
ran our pilots 87,88, which may affect responses to the Lockdown dilemma, we planned 
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to examine the robustness of our findings using two variations of the models described 
above, one that includes the Lockdown dilemma and another that omits it. 
As some of the countries in our sample already implement mandatory and/or 
invasive contact tracing schemes at the time of writing (China, India, Israel, Singapore, 
and South Korea), which may affect responses to the Tracing dilemma, we also planned 
to examine the robustness of our findings in these countries using two variations of the 
models described above, one that includes the Tracing dilemma and another that omits 
it. Furthermore, in this subset of countries we planned to examine an order effect to test 
whether completing the Tracing dilemma in the first task affects behavior on the 
subsequent task. 
 
Null hypothesis testing. In the event of non-significant results from the 
approaches outlined above, we planned to employ the TOST procedure 89 to 
differentiate between insensitive versus null results. In particular, we planned to specify 
lower and upper equivalence bounds based on standardized effect sizes set by our 
SESOI (see Power Analysis and Table 2). For each of our two tasks, should the larger 
of the two p values from the two t tests be smaller than alpha = .05, we would conclude 
statistical equivalence. For example, the minimum guaranteed sample size (N = 12,600; 
see Sample Size for details) would give us over 95% power to detect an effect size of d 
= 0.05 in the self-report task, yielding standardized ΔL = -0.05 and ΔU = 0.05, and OR = 




Participants. We planned to complete the study online with participants in the 
following countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, 
Germany, India, Israel, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 1A). We sampled on every inhabited 
continent and included countries that have been more or less severely affected by 
COVID-19 on a variety of metrics (Supplementary Figure 1). Country selection was 
determined primarily on a convenience basis. In April 2020, the senior author put out a 
call for collaborators via social media and email. Potential collaborators were asked 
whether they had the capacity to recruit up to 1,000 participants representative for age 
and gender within their home country. After the initial set of collaborators was 
established, we added additional countries to diversify our sample with respect to 
geographic location and pandemic severity.  
We planned to recruit participants via online survey platforms (see 
Supplementary Table 1) and compensate them financially for their participation in 
accordance with local standard rates. We aimed to recruit samples that were nationally 
representative with respect to age and gender where feasible. We anticipated that this 
would be feasible for many, but not all countries in our study (see Supplementary Table 
1 for details). We originally anticipated sampling to take place over a 14-day period, but 
to allow for more representative sampling (after discussion with the editor), we collected 
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data over a period of 27 days (November 26th 2020 to December 22nd 2020). All 
survey materials were translated into the local language (see Translations for details). 
Prior to the survey, all participants read and approved a consent form outlining their 
risks and benefits, confirmed they agreed to participate in the experiment, and 
completed two attention checks. Participants who failed to agree to the consent or failed 
to pass the attention checks were not permitted to complete the survey (with the 
exception of participants in the United States and the United Kingdom, who due to 
recruitment platform requirements were instead allowed to continue the survey, and 
were only excluded after data collection).  
 
Expected effect sizes. We informed our expected effect sizes by examining the 
published literature on utilitarianism and trust. Previous studies of social impressions of 
utilitarians reveal effect sizes in the range of d = 0.19 – 0.78 (mean d = 0.78 for the 
effect of instrumental harm on self-reported moral impressions; mean d = 0.19 for the 
effect of impartial beneficence on self-reported moral impressions; mean d = 0.55 for 
interactive effects of instrumental harm and impartial beneficence on self-reported moral 
impressions)35–39. However, there are several important caveats with using these past 
studies to inform expected effect sizes for the current study. First, past studies have 
measured trust in ordinary people, while we study trust in leaders, and there is evidence 
that instrumental harm and impartial beneficence differentially impact attitudes about 
leaders versus ordinary people37. Second, past studies have investigated artificial moral 
dilemmas, while we study real moral dilemmas in the context of an ongoing pandemic. 
Third, past studies have been conducted in a small number of Western countries (US, 
UK, Germany) while we sample across a much wider range of countries on 6 
continents. Finally, for the voting task, it is more challenging to estimate an expected 
effect size because no previous studies to our knowledge have used such a task.  
Because of the caveats described above, we also informed our expectations of 
effect sizes with data from Pilot 2, which was identical to the proposed studies in design 
apart from using The Red Cross instead of UNICEF in the voting task and the omission 
of the Tracing dilemma (see Pilot Data in Supplementary Information for a full 
description of the pilot experiments). Pilot 2 revealed a conventionally medium effect 
size for the interaction between argument and moral dimension in the self-report task (B 
= 2.88, SE = 0.24, t(452) = 11.80, p < .001, CI = [2.41, 3.35], d = 0.55), and a 
conventionally large effect size for the effect of moral dimension in the voting task (B = 
2.41, SE = 0.33, z = 7.30, p < .001, CI = [1.77, 3.13], OR = 11.13, d = 1.33). 
 
Sample size. Sample size was determined based on a cost-benefit analysis 
considering available resources and expected effect sizes that would be theoretically 
informative 89 (see Expected effect sizes). We aimed to collect the largest sample 
possible with resources available and verified with power analyses that our planned 
sample would be able to detect effect sizes that are theoretically informative and at least 
as large as expected based on prior literature (see Power Analysis). We expected to 
collect a sample of 21,000 participants in total, which conservatively accounting for 
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exclusion rates up to 40% (see Exclusions) would lead to a final guaranteed minimum 
sample of 12,600 participants. 
 
Power analysis. We conducted a series of power analyses to determine the 
smallest effect sizes that our minimum guaranteed sample of 12,600 participants would 
be able to detect with 95% power and an alpha level of .005, separately for each main 
model (see Analysis Plan for Hypothesis Testing for further details). To account for 
these two hypothesis tests, for all power analyses we applied Bonferroni corrections for 
two tests, thus yielding an alpha of .0025. Following recent suggestions 90,91, results 
passing a corrected alpha of p < .005 are interpreted as ‘supportive evidence’ for our 
hypotheses, while results passing a corrected alpha of p < .05 are interpreted as 
‘suggestive evidence’. Power analyses were conducted using Monte Carlo simulations 
92 via the R package simr 93, with 1,000 simulations, using estimates of means and 
variances from pilot 2 (see Pilot Data in Supplementary Information for a full description 
of the pilot experiments; note that, for the purposes of the current simulations, the race 
variable was omitted from data analysis because this variable is not readily comparable 
across countries). Data and code for power analyses can be found at 
https://osf.io/m9tpu/. 
First, we considered the interactive effect of moral dimension (Instrumental Harm 
vs. Impartial Beneficence) and argument (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian) on trust in the 
self-report task. We estimated that a sample of 12,600 participants would provide over 
95% power to detect an effect size of d = 0.05 (power = 99.3%, CI = [98.56, 99.72]). 
This effect size is 9% of what we observed in pilot 2 and is the SESOI for the self-report 
task. 
Next, we considered the effect of moral dimension (Instrumental Harm vs. 
Impartial Beneficence) on leader choice in the voting task. We estimated that a sample 
of 12,600 participants would provide over 95% power to detect an odds ratio of 1.30 
(power = 95.8%, CI = [94.36, 96.96]). This effect size is 9% of what we observed in pilot 
2 and is the SESOI for the voting task. 
Given that these SESOI values are detectable at 95% power with our guaranteed 
sample (total N = 12,600), are theoretically informative, and are lower than our expected 
effect sizes (see Expected effect sizes), we concluded that our sample is sufficient to 
provide over 95% power for testing our hypotheses, and that our study is highly 
powered to detect useful effects. 
At the time of submission, online survey platform representatives indicated that, 
while it is normally feasible to recruit samples nationally representative for age and 
gender in most of our target countries, due to the ongoing pandemic, final sample sizes 
may be unpredictable and in some countries it would not be possible to achieve fully 
representative quotas for some demographic categories, including women and older 
people (see Supplementary Table 1 for details). We planned that, if this issue arose, we 
would prioritize statistical power over representativeness. If we were unable to achieve 
representativeness for age and/or gender in particular countries, we planned to note this 
explicitly in the Results section. 
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Exclusions. We planned to exclude participants from all further analyses if they 
met at least one of the following criteria: (1) they had taken the survey more than once 
(as indicated by IP address or worker ID); (2) they reported in a question about their 
residence (further described in Design) that they lived in a country different from that of 
intended recruitment; (3) they did not answer more than 50% of the questions. In 
addition, participants would be selectively excluded from specific analyses if they (4) did 
not provide a response and are thus missing variables involved in the analysis; or (5) 






All data and materials are openly available on the Open Science Framework 





All analysis code (completed in R) are openly available on the Open Science 
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Extended Data Figure 1. Overview of Experimental Design. Across subjects, we 
randomized the order of the voting and self-report tasks, the order of dilemmas in the 
self-report task, and the order of leaders in the voting task.  
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Dilemma introduction
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We conducted two pilots to establish both proof of concept and the feasibility of 
our methods (see https://osf.io/m9tpu/).  
 
Pilot 1. We recruited a convenience sample of British participants (N = 100, after 
exclusions N = 98; N women = 56, N men = 40, N participants with another gender 
identity = 2; Mean age = 31.87) on Prolific in July 2020, in which participants read five 
different COVID moral dilemmas. In a within-subjects design, participants completed the 
“dilemma introduction” (see Methods in Main Text) for each of five dilemmas presented 
in randomized order. Following the introduction to each dilemma, participants were 
presented with two leaders in randomized order: a “utilitarian” leader, who argued for a 
utilitarian policy solution to the dilemma, and a “non-utilitarian” leader who rejected it. 
For each leader, participants provided two ratings of trustworthiness (“How trustworthy 
do you think this person is?” and “How likely would you be to trust this person’s advice 
on other issues?”, both on a 7-point scale), which we averaged (separately for each 
participant, dilemma, and leader) to create a composite trust measure.  
We conducted a linear mixed-effects model of the effect of argument type 
(Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial 
Beneficence), and their interaction, on the composite score of trust, adding 
demographic variables (namely race, gender, age, education level, income, political 
ideology, and religiosity), and policy support as fixed effects, and dilemmas and 
participants as random intercepts. For the purposes of the analysis, we used effect 
coding such that for argument type, the Non-Utilitarian condition is coded as -0.5 and 
the Utilitarian condition as 0.5, and for the dimension type, Instrumental Harm is coded 
as -0.5, and Impartial Beneficence as 0.5. The demographic covariates were grand 
2 
mean-centered; the gender variable was dummy coded with “woman” as baseline, and 
the race variable was dummy coded with “other” as baseline. P-values were computed 
using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom as implemented in 
lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/. 
We observed no significant main effect of either argument type (B = -0.01, 
standard error [SE] = 0.08, t(875) = -0.15, p = .881, confidence interval [CI] = [-0.17, 
0.14]) or dimension type (B = -0.01, SE = 0.17, t(3) = -0.07, p = .946, CI = [-0.34, 0.31]), 
but crucially, a significant interaction between argument and dimension type (B = 2.33, 
SE = 0.16, t(875) = 14.67, p < .001, CI = [2.02, 2.64]). Post-hoc comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections confirmed that in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, utilitarian leaders 
were seen as less trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian 
leaders = 3.48, SE = 0.24, CI = [2.86, 4.11]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders = 4.66, 
SE = 0.24, CI = [4.04, 5.28]; B = -1.18, SE = 0.10, t(875) = -11.72, p < .001, CI = [-1.37, 
-0.98]), but in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas this effect was reversed, such that 
utilitarian leaders were seen as more trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust 
for utilitarian leaders = 4.64, SE = 0.25, CI = [3.97, 5.30]; mean trust for non-utilitarian 
leaders = 3.48, SE = 0.25, CI = [2.82, 4.15]; B = 1.15, SE = 0.12, t(875) = 9.37, p < 
.001, CI = [0.91, 1.39]; see Supplementary Figure 2; for results by dilemma, see 
Supplementary Figure 3). 
 
Pilot 2. For the second pilot experiment, which included both the voting task and the 
self-report task, we recruited a convenience sample of U.S. participants (N = 503, after 
exclusions N = 469; N women = 239, N men = 212, N participants with another gender 
identity = 18; Mean age = 30.33) on Prolific in July 2020. They completed a procedure 
mostly identical to that described in the Methods section, with the exception that this 
pilot did not include attention or comprehension checks, it did not include the Tracing 
dilemma, and we used The Red Cross instead of UNICEF in the voting task. 
Participants in this pilot experiment were voter participants in the voting task. A few 
days prior to running the main pilot experiment, we recruited a convenience sample of 
donor participants (total N = 103, after exclusions N = 100; N women = 59, N men = 37, 
N participants with another gender identity = 4; Mean age = 30.16) via Prolific. The 
donor participants chose to contribute a total of $71.80 to The Red Cross. We displayed 
this amount to voter participants in the main pilot experiment. 
Following the analysis plan we employed in the Registered Report (see Analysis 
Plan), for the self-report task, we conducted a linear mixed-effects model of the effect of 
argument type (Utilitarian vs. Non-Utilitarian), dimension type (Instrumental Harm vs. 
Impartial Beneficence), and their interaction, on the composite score of trust, adding 
demographic variables (namely race, gender, age, education level, income, political 
beliefs, and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, and dilemmas and 
participants as random intercepts. For the purposes of the analysis, we used effect 
coding such that for argument type, the Non-Utilitarian condition was coded as -0.5 and 
the Utilitarian condition as 0.5, and for the dimension type, Instrumental Harm is coded 
as -0.5, and Impartial Beneficence as 0.5. The demographic covariates were grand 
mean-centered; the gender variable was dummy coded with “woman” as baseline, and 
3 
the race variable was dummy coded with “other” as baseline. P-values were computed 
using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom as implemented in 
lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/.  
For self-reported trust, there was a significant main effect of argument type (B = -
0.58, SE = 0.12, t(452) = -4.75, p < .001, CI = [-0.82, -0.35]), no main effect of 
dimension type (B = 0.10, SE = 0.27, t(3) = 0.38, p = .730, CI = [-0.41, 0.62]), and 
crucially, a significant interaction between argument and dimension type (B = 2.88, SE = 
0.24, t(452) = 11.80, p < .001, CI = [2.41, 3.35]). Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni 
corrections confirmed that in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, utilitarian leaders were seen 
as less trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian leaders = 3.14, 
SE = 0.24, CI = [2.33, 3.95]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders = 5.16, SE = 0.24, CI 
= [4.35, 5.96]; B = -2.02, SE = 0.17, t(454) = -11.59, p < .001, CI = [-2.36, -1.68]), but in 
Impartial Beneficence dilemmas this effect was reversed, such that utilitarian leaders 
were seen as more trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian 
leaders = 4.68, SE = 0.24, CI = [3.88, 5.48]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders = 3.82, 
SE = 0.24, CI = [3.02, 4.63]; B = 0.86, SE = 0.17, t(455) = 5.00, p < .001, CI = [0.52, 
1.19]; see Supplementary Figure 4; for results by dilemma, see Supplementary Figure 
5). 
For the voting task, we first excluded participants who reported not 
understanding the task (N = 17; remaining N = 452). Following the analysis plan we 
employed in the Registered Report (see Analysis Plan) for the voting task, we ran a 
generalized linear mixed-effects model with the logit link of the effect of dimension type 
(Instrumental Harm vs. Impartial Beneficence) on the leader choice (Utilitarian vs. Non-
Utilitarian), adding demographic variables (namely race, gender, age, education level, 
income, political beliefs, and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects, and dilemma 
as a random intercept. For the purposes of the analysis, we used effect coding such 
that for the binary response variable of argument type, the Non-Utilitarian trust response 
is coded as 0 and the Utilitarian trust response as 1, and for the dimension type, 
Instrumental Harm is coded as -0.5, and Impartial Beneficence as 0.5. The 
demographic covariates were grand mean-centered; the gender variable was dummy 
coded with “woman” as baseline, and the race variable was dummy coded with “other” 
as baseline. P-values were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees 
of freedom as implemented in lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/. 
We found a significant main effect for dimension type (B = 2.41, SE = 0.33, z = 
7.30, p < .001, CI = [1.77, 3.13], OR = 11.13). Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni 
corrections confirmed that in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, participants were less likely 
to vote for utilitarian leaders than non-utilitarian leaders (probability of choosing 
utilitarian leader = 0.15, SE = 0.05, CI = [0.06, 0.31]), but in Impartial Beneficence 
dilemmas this effect was reversed, such that participants were more likely to vote for 
utilitarian leaders than non-utilitarian leaders (probability of choosing utilitarian leader = 
0.65, SE = 0.08, CI = [0.46, 0.81]; see Supplementary Figure 6). In other words, 
participants were more than 11 times more likely to choose the utilitarian leader in 
Impartial Beneficence dilemmas compared to Instrumental Harm dilemmas.  
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We note here that this model yielded a singular fit, due to the addition of 
dilemmas as a random intercept. First, we confirmed that a more parsimonious model, 
identical in every way except for the omission of the random intercept, yielded 
convergent results (for analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/). Given the theoretical 
importance of including dilemmas as a random intercept, we report here the results of 
the more theoretically appropriate maximal random effects structure, which should be 












Think ahead several months into the future. Imagine that the U.S. is in the middle of 
another wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there is still no vaccine available. After a 
surge in cases, political leaders have imposed strict nationwide restrictions, with stay-at-
home orders and closures of schools, offices, shops, restaurants, bars, theaters, and so 
on.  
 
These restrictions have now been in place for three months. It’s clear that the policy is 
working to reduce the number of deaths, especially amongst vulnerable people. 
However, these prolonged restrictions are taking their toll. Mental health experts and 
economists are increasingly concerned about the effects of continued restrictions on 
people’s overall wellbeing. Because of this, political leaders are debating when to lift the 
restrictions and reopen schools and businesses. 
 
Some are arguing that we should consider lifting the restrictions immediately. They 
argue that even though resuming activities now will cause more COVID-related deaths 
in the short-term, the economic and social consequences of continuing the prolonged 
restrictions could cause worse suffering overall in the long term. 
 
Others are arguing that the restrictions should stay in place at least until a vaccine is 
available. They argue that the country has a primary responsibility to protect its 




Which policy do you think should be adopted? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly support  
keeping the prolonged restrictions Indifferent 
Strongly support  







Morality Measure (exploratory) 
 
How morally right or wrong would it be to lift restrictions before a vaccine is 
available? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







COVID-19 remains a public health threat. Public health officials have announced that 
citizens should be on alert for another dangerous wave of the pandemic. 
 
If the predictions are correct, there will not be enough ventilators and hospital beds to 
treat everyone, and doctors are going to have to make difficult decisions about how to 
ration medical care. Political leaders are calling for a policy to be put into place now so 
the same standards can be applied in hospitals across the country. 
 
Some are arguing that when allocating access to ventilators and other forms of 
healthcare, doctors should prioritize younger and healthier people because they are 
more likely to survive treatment. 
 
Others are arguing that everyone should have equal access to treatment, regardless of 




Which policy do you think should be adopted? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly support  
everyone having  





 and healthier people 





Morality Measure (exploratory) 
 
How morally right or wrong would it be to prioritize younger and healthier people 
for COVID treatment? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







COVID-19 remains a threat to public health. Scientists are suggesting that an effective 
way to prevent the spread of COVID-19 is through wide-reaching and mandatory 
"contact tracing." This works by using technology to trace people’s movements and 
interactions with other people. If someone tests positive for COVID-19, the technology 
can alert others who have been in contact with that person. 
 
Public officials are considering a new contact tracing program that goes much further 
than current contact tracing efforts. This new program is estimated to be more effective 
at containing the pandemic, but is also more invasive of individual privacy. This 
proposal involves delivering inexpensive contact tracing devices to each resident. The 
small devices, which don’t require a mobile phone and can be worn on a lanyard or 
carried in a handbag, use GPS and cellular technology to continuously trace the 
wearer’s movements. The new program would require residents to carry a tracing 
device whenever they leave their homes, and residents could be fined if they fail to 
bring the device with them.  
 
Some are arguing that the government should make it mandatory for individuals to carry 
tracing devices with them whenever they leave their homes. They are saying that 
sometimes you have to sacrifice privacy for the greater good.  
 
Others argue that these tracing devices should be only voluntary, because forcing 











Which policy do you think should be adopted? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly support  





the tracing devices 
being mandatory 
 
Morality Measure (exploratory) 
 
How morally right or wrong would it be to make it mandatory for individuals to 
carry contact tracing devices with them wherever they go? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







COVID-19 remains a public health threat. Public health officials have announced that 
citizens should be on alert for another dangerous wave of the pandemic. 
 
Imagine that a pharmaceutical company based in the U.S. has developed an effective 
treatment. The company is manufacturing the medicine as quickly as possible, but it is 
unlikely there will be sufficient supplies when the next wave hits. Political leaders are 
debating how the medicine should be distributed around the globe. 
 
Some are arguing that the medicine should be sent wherever it can achieve the greatest 
good, even if that means sending it to other countries. 
 
Others are arguing that the medicine should be kept in the U.S., because the 









Which policy do you think should be adopted? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly support  
U.S.-made medicine  
being reserved for  
treating American citizens 
Indifferent 
Strongly support 
U.S.-made medicine  
being given to  
whoever needs it most 
 
Morality Measure (exploratory) 
 
How morally right or wrong would it be for U.S.-made medicine to be given to 
whoever needs it most, even if that means sending it to other countries? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 







Think ahead several months into the future. Imagine that COVID-19 cases are rising 
again around the world and public health officials have announced that citizens should 
be on alert for another dangerous wave of the pandemic. 
 
If the predictions are correct, there will soon be another global shortage of personal 
protective equipment (PPE). Political leaders are debating how personal protective 
equipment should be distributed around the globe. 
 
Some are arguing that PPE made in American factories should be sent wherever it can 
do the most good, even if that means sending it to other countries. 
 
Others are arguing that PPE made in American factories should be kept in the U.S., 








Which policy do you think should be adopted? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly support  
U.S.-made PPE  
being reserved for  
protecting American citizens 
Indifferent 
Strongly support  
U.S.-made PPE  
being given to  
whoever needs it most 
 
Morality Measure (exploratory) 
 
How morally right or wrong would it be for U.S.-made PPE to be given to whoever 
needs it most, even if that means sending it to other countries? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Absolutely morally wrong  Neither right nor wrong  Absolutely morally right 
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Note: Order of utilitarian and non-utilitarian leaders was randomized (i.e., randomly 
assigned to Person 1 and Person 2 in the instructions below). 
 
Introduction (displayed for all dilemmas) 
 
We now ask you to make a choice that has real financial consequences. A few 
days ago, a group of 100 people were recruited via an international online marketplace 
and invited to make donations to the charitable organization UNICEF. In total, they 
donated an amount equivalent to [AMOUNT]. 
  
We would like you to vote for a leader to be responsible for the entire group's 
donations. The leader has two options: 
! They can transfer the group's [AMOUNT] donation to UNICEF in full, or 
! They can take some of this money for themselves (up to the full amount) and 





We now want you to vote between two people to be the leader responsible for the 
donations. We showed both people the debate you just read about reopening schools 
and businesses, and asked them what they thought.  
1. Person 1 believes that restrictions should stay in place at least until a 
vaccine is available. They agreed with the statement, "As leaders, our primary 
duty is to protect our citizens. We must think of our responsibilities to one 
another, and we cannot sacrifice some of our most vulnerable people in pursuit 
of the greater good." 
2. Person 2 believes that we should consider lifting the restrictions 
immediately. They agreed with the statement, "We need to think about all the 
consequences. Preventing deaths from COVID isn’t all that matters, and 
continuing these prolonged restrictions will have a far worse effect on our overall 
well-being." 
 
Please vote for which person you wish to be the leader. For the person who gets 
the majority number of votes, we will implement their decision and make the payments 
accordingly. 
○ Person 1, the person who believes restrictions should stay in place at least until a 
vaccine is available. 





We now want you to vote between two people to be the leader responsible for the 
donations. We showed both people the debate you just read about how to distribute 
healthcare resources, and asked them what they thought. 
1. Person 1 believes that younger and healthier people should be prioritized 
for COVID treatment. They agreed with the statement, "We have to think about 
how we can do the most good with the resources we have, and that means 
prioritizing those people who have the best chance of recovering and living a 
long and healthy life."  
2. Person 2 believes that doctors should give everyone equal access to 
COVID treatment. They agreed with the statement, "It’s not our place to choose 
who lives. Everyone has the same right to receive equal access to treatment, and 
we cannot abandon our most vulnerable in an effort to save more lives." 
 
Please vote for which person you wish to be the leader. For the person who gets 
the majority number of votes, we will implement their decision and make the payments 
accordingly. 
○ Person 1, the person who believes that younger and healthier people should be 
prioritized for COVID treatment. 
○ Person 2, the person who believes that doctors should give everyone equal 





We now want you to vote between two people to be the leader responsible for the 
donations. We showed both people the debate you just read about mandatory contact 
tracing, and asked them what they thought. 
1. Person 1 believes that it should be mandatory for residents to carry tracing 
devices whenever they leave their homes. They agreed with the statement, 
"We need to control the pandemic, and sometimes you have to sacrifice the right 
to privacy for the greater good."  
2. Person 2 believes that it should be voluntary for residents to carry tracing 
devices whenever they leave their homes. They agreed with the statement, 
"Everyone has a right to privacy, and we cannot sacrifice this right in an effort to 
control the pandemic." 
 
Please vote for which person you wish to be the leader. For the person who gets 
the majority number of votes, we will implement their decision and make the payments 
accordingly. 
○ Person 1, the person who believes that it should be mandatory for residents to 
carry tracing devices whenever they leave their homes. 
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○ Person 2, the person who believes that it should be voluntary for residents to 





We now want you to vote between two people to be the leader responsible for the 
donations. We showed both people the debate you just read about distributing medicine 
for COVID, and asked them what they thought. 
1. Person 1 believes that U.S.-made medicine should be reserved for treating 
American citizens. They agreed with the statement, "We have a right to use our 
own resources to help our own citizens before everyone else. Other countries 
can produce their own treatments for COVID-19." 
2. Person 2 believes that U.S.-made medicine should be given to whoever 
needs it most, even if that means sending it to other countries. They agreed 
with the statement, "COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans 
equally. We need to be impartial and send treatment where it can achieve the 
greatest good.” 
 
Please vote for which person you wish to be the leader. For the person who gets 
the majority number of votes, we will implement their decision and make the payments 
accordingly. 
○ Person 1, the person who believes that U.S.-made medicine should be reserved 
for treating American citizens. 
○ Person 2, the person who believes that U.S.-made medicine should be given to 





We now want you to vote between two people to be the leader responsible for the 
donations. We showed both people the debate you just read about keeping personal 
protective equipment in the U.S., and asked them what they thought.  
1. Person 1 believes that U.S.-made PPE should be given to whoever needs it 
most, even if that means sending it to other countries. They agreed with the 
statement, "COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans. We need to 
be impartial in how we distribute resources like PPE and send it where it can 
achieve the greatest good." 
2. Person 2 believes that U.S.-made PPE should be reserved for protecting 
American citizens. They agreed with the statement, "We have a duty to protect 
our own citizens first, not everyone in the world. Other countries are responsible 
for protecting their own citizens from COVID-19."  
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Please vote for which person you wish to be the leader. For the person who gets 
the majority number of votes, we will implement their decision and make the payments 
accordingly. 
○ Person 1, the person who believes that U.S.-made PPE should be given to 
whoever needs it most, even if that means sending it to other countries. 
○ Person 2, the person who believes that U.S.-made PPE should be reserved for 







We're giving you a choice to allocate some real money. We are awarding you a $2.00 
bonus on top of your payment for participating in this study. You have the choice of how 
much of this bonus you want to keep for yourself, and how much you'd like to donate to 
UNICEF. 
 
UNICEF is a humanitarian organization working on the ground in more than 190 
countries, partnering with front-line responders and providing them with the information 
and resources they need to keep children healthy and learning and protected from 
sickness and violence during the pandemic. 
 
How much of your $2.00 bonus would you like to donate to UNICEF? 
 
Whatever is remaining will be added to your total payment. 
 
I would like to donate... 





Earlier in this study, we gave you the opportunity to donate to UNICEF. We are 
recruiting 100 participants in this study, who all have the chance to make donations. 
After we get all the donation decisions, we are going to select one participant to be 
responsible for the donations of the whole group.  
 
Because each of you can choose to donate an amount between $0 and $2, the total 
amount you will be responsible for if you are selected to be responsible for the group 
will range from $0 to $200. 
  
If you are selected to be responsible for the group, you can choose to transfer 100% of 
the donation money to UNICEF. Or, you can choose to keep some of the money for 
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yourself, and transfer the rest to UNICEF. Any money you choose to keep from the 
group's total would be added to your bonus.  
 
If you are selected to be responsible for the group's donations, what percentage of the 
total donations do you want to keep as an additional bonus?  
 
I would like to keep _% of the total amount 





3. Supplementary Method: Self-Report Task 
 
Note: Selection of either the utilitarian or non-utilitarian leader was randomized. The 






Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that restrictions should 
stay in place at least until a vaccine is available. 
 
This mayor said, "As leaders, our primary duty is to protect our citizens. We must think 
of our responsibilities to one another, and we cannot sacrifice some of our most 
vulnerable people in pursuit of the greater good."  
 
How trustworthy do you think this person is? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 








How likely would you be to trust this person's advice on other issues? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 










Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that we should consider 
lifting restrictions immediately. 
 
This mayor said, "We need to think about all the consequences. Preventing deaths from 
COVID isn’t all that matters, and continuing these prolonged restrictions will have a far 






How trustworthy do you think this person is? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 








How likely would you be to trust this person's advice on other issues? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 












Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that doctors should give 
everyone equal access to COVID treatment. 
 
This mayor said, "It’s not our place to choose who lives. Everyone has the same right to 
receive equal access to treatment, and we cannot abandon our most vulnerable in an 




Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that younger and 
healthier people should be prioritized for COVID treatment. 
 
This mayor said, "We have to think about how we can do the most good with the 
resources we have, and that means prioritizing those people who have the best chance 







Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that it should be 




This mayor said, "Everyone has a right to privacy, and we cannot sacrifice this right in 




Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that it should be 
mandatory for residents to carry contact tracing devices whenever they leave their 
homes. 
 
This mayor said, "We need to control the pandemic, and sometimes you have to 







Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that U.S.-made medicine 
should be reserved for treating American citizens. 
  
This mayor said, "We have a right to use our own resources to help our own citizens 




Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that U.S.-made medicine 
should be given to whoever needs it most, even if that means sending it to other 
countries.  
 
This mayor said, "COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans equally. We 








Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that U.S.-made PPE 
should be reserved for protecting American citizens. 
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This mayor said, "We have a duty to protect our own citizens first, not everyone in the 




Imagine that the mayor of a major city in your region is arguing that U.S.-made PPE 
should be given to whoever needs it most, even if that means sending it to other 
countries. 
 
This mayor said, "COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans. We need to 
be impartial in how we distribute resources like PPE and send it where it can achieve 






1. Supplementary Results: Representativeness 
 
To evaluate the representativeness of our samples across gender categories, we 
computed the difference between expected (based on population characteristics) and 
actual proportion of participants who identified as men or women, separately for each 
country. Most differences were under or equal to 5%, suggesting that our samples were 
broadly nationally representative for gender in the majority of our sampled countries, 
with two exceptions: Singapore (women were underrepresented by 6%), and United 
Arab Emirates (men were underrepresented by 21%).  
To evaluate representativeness of our samples across age categories, we 
computed the difference between expected (based on population characteristics) and 
actual proportion of participants in each age category, separately for each country. Most 
differences were less than or equal to 5%, suggesting that our samples were broadly 
nationally representative for age in the majority of our sampled countries. In six 
countries, participants in older age categories were underrepresented: Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (with an 11% difference between expected and actual proportion of 
participants in the 45 to 54 age category, 7% in the 55 to 64 age category, and 6% in 
the over 65 age category – while younger participants were overrepresented by 15% in 
the 25 to 34 age category), Singapore (6% in the 45 to 54 age category, 12% in the 55 
to 64 age category, and 15% in the over 65 age category – while younger participants 
were overrepresented by 17% in the 25 to 34 age category, and by 11% in the 35 to 44 
age category), South Korea (7% in the over 65 age category), United Arab Emirates 
(8% in the 45 to 54 age category, and 6% in the 55 to 64 age category – while younger 
participants were overrepresented by 9% in the 18 to 24 age category, by 7% in the 25 
to 34 age category), United Kingdom (13% in the over 65 age category – while 
participants in the 55-64 age category were overrepresented by 9%), and United States 
(8% in the over 65 age category). In contrast, participants in the over 65 age category 
were overrepresented in Germany (by 6%). 
 
2. Supplementary Results: Alternative Model Structure for Voting Task 
 
Previous work arguing that linear models should be preferred over logit models is 
based on tests of models without random effects2. Therefore, we first looked at whether 
the discrepancy between the binomial and linear models was due to an overly complex 
random effects structure. Indeed, when removing the random effects (of countries and 
dilemmas), and retaining solely the fixed effects (of demographic variables, own policy 
preference, and moral dimension), the binomial and linear models converged and both 
supported our predictions. We found a strong effect of moral dimension on leader 
choice (main effect of dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.34, SE = 0.05, z = 26.38, 
p < .001, CI = [1.22, 1.45], OR = 3.80; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.21, SE = 0.02, CI = [0.17, 0.25]; probability of 
choosing utilitarian leader in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.50, SE = 0.02, CI = 
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[0.45, 0.56]; main effect of dimension type in linear model: B = 0.19, SE = 0.01, t = 
28.05, p < .001, CI = [0.17, 0.20]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.30, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.27, 0.33], in Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas = 0.49, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.46, 0.52]). Further evidence that the 
unusual results from the linear pre-registered model were driven by error estimation 
from an overly complex random effects structure came from a second model where we 
added countries as random effects with robust standard errors. Here, the model yielded 
highly significant results (B = 0.19, SE = 0.01, t = 15.78, p < .001, CI = [0.16, 0.21]; 
probability of choosing utilitarian leader in Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.30, SE = 
0.02, CI = [0.26, 0.35], in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.49, SE = 0.02, CI = [0.43, 
0.54]).  
Because the random effects structure appeared to cause issues with the linear 
model, but dilemmas and countries are of clear theoretical interest, we next ran 
additional exploratory models retaining countries as fixed effects (along with the fixed 
effects of demographic variables, own policy support, and moral dimension). These 
analyses again confirmed a strong effect of moral dimension on leader choice, both in 
the binomial and linear models (main effect of dimension type in binomial model: B = 
1.34, SE = 0.05, z = 26.37, p < .001, CI = [1.23, 1.46], OR = 3.84; probability of 
choosing utilitarian leader in Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.21, SE = 0.02, CI = [0.18, 
0.25]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.51, 
SE = 0.02, CI = [0.45, 0.57]; main effect of dimension type in linear model: B = 0.19, SE 
= 0.01, t = 28.08, p < .001, CI = [0.17, 0.20]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.31, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.27, 0.34], in Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas = 0.49, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.46, 0.52]).  
Next, we considered models that varied in the complexity of the covariate 
structure, based on recent recommendations that simpler models should be preferred 
over those with a complex covariate structure3,4. We ran additional exploratory models 
removing all covariates and simply predicting leader choice from moral dimension. 
Again, the binomial and linear model both confirmed a strong effect of moral dimension 
on leader choice (main effect of dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.37, SE = 0.04, 
z = 35.90, p < .001, CI = [1.28, 1.45], OR = 3.92; probability of choosing utilitarian 
leader in Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.28, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.26, 0.29]; probability of 
choosing utilitarian leader in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.60, SE = 0.01, CI = 
[0.58, 0.61]; main effect of dimension type in linear model: B = 0.32, SE = 0.01, t = 
38.76, p < .001, CI = [0.30, 0.34]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 0.28, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.26, 0.29], in Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas = 0.60, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.58, 0.61]).  
Finally, we employed a disciplined approach to covariate selection5 by using a 
double lasso procedure: we began with all demographics (namely gender, age, 
education, subjective SES, political ideology, and religiosity), own policy support, and 
country, and identified via two separate lasso regressions the ones that strongly 
predicted either voting preferences or dimension. Next, we ran a linear model with these 
empirically supported covariates (all except for education); this again revealed a strong 
effect of moral dimension on leader choice (B = 0.19, SE = 0.01, t = 28.08, p < .001, CI 
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= [0.17, 0.20]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader in Instrumental Harm dilemmas = 
0.30, SE = 0.01, CI = [0.27, 0.34], in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas = 0.49, SE = 0.01, 
CI = [0.46, 0.52]). Finally, we verified that the random structure of our data did not alter 
our results by conducting randomization inference, wherein the effect size obtained in 
the data (where treatment assignment had been randomized within each country) is 
compared to a sharp null distribution (where all possible treatment assignments are 
simulated, and the treatment effect is null for all subjects). This analysis confirmed that 
the observed effect of dimension on voting choices in the behavioral task (B = 0.19 in a 
model predicting voting choices from moral dimension along with all demographic 
covariates and own policy preferences) was significantly different from the null 





1. Utilitarian versus non-utilitarian approaches to moral dilemmas. 
2. Utilitarian arguments in the lockdown dilemma. 
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1. Utilitarian versus non-utilitarian approaches to moral dilemmas. 
In moral psychology, moral dilemmas are often characterised in terms of a conflict 
between utilitarianism and deontology. While deontological approaches are the most 
commonly discussed counterpoint to utilitarianism, there are other ethical approaches 
that are neither deontological nor utilitarian, such as virtue ethics. Moreover, there are 
many different types of deontological theories, and while these cohere in agreeing that 
there is more to morality than the utilitarian impartial maximization of welfare, they often 
disagree on the specific details. Therefore, for precision, and to avoid inviting 
conclusions about specific deontological approaches to morality, in this paper we refer 
to “utilitarian” and “non-utilitarian” agents. 
 
2. Utilitarian arguments in the lockdown dilemma. 
Aren’t there good utilitarian arguments for lockdowns? Why does the utilitarian leader 
argue for lifting restrictions in your Lockdown dilemma? 
 
Utilitarianism says that what matters is what brings about the best consequences, and 
wherever there is disagreement about what would have the best overall consequences, 
there can be disagreement on utilitarian grounds for what action is correct.  
 
In the case of lockdown, it is certainly possible to construct both utilitarian and non-
utilitarian/deontological arguments for pro- and anti-lockdown positions, particularly 
because there are many types of lockdowns that have been implemented around the 
world during this pandemic. For example, one could argue that we need to sacrifice 
individual freedoms for the greater good, to prevent hospitals from overflooding. Or one 
could argue that the economic consequences of a lockdown are less bad than the 
economic consequences of letting the pandemic run rampant. 
 
In the current work, we test a very specific case of lockdown that maps more clearly 
onto utilitarian and non-utilitarian arguments. Our dilemma describes a lockdown that 
has been dragging on for three months, with no clear end in sight, that is having a 
clearly negative impact on citizens’ wellbeing. (This specific dilemma resembles a 
situation in the Philippines, where citizens endured a continuous lockdown for more 
than three months and citizens there reported historic lows in wellbeing.)  
 
In the specific dilemma that we are testing, the anti-lockdown position is clearly argued 
on utilitarian grounds and the pro-lockdown position is clearly argued on non-utilitarian, 
deontological grounds. We constructed these arguments based on public statements 
made by political leaders and prominent utilitarian philosophers like Peter Singer, who 
have quite consistently argued against lockdown using utilitarian arguments (e.g. “It 
pains us to say it, but US President Donald Trump is right. We can't let the cure be 
worse than the disease. Lockdowns have health benefits: fewer will die of COVID-19, as 
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well as other transmissible diseases. But they have real social and economic costs, 
[including] social isolation, unemployment, and widespread bankruptcies”: Singer & 
Plant, April 6th 2020).  
 
Future studies might focus on exploring lockdown dilemmas more extensively by 
investigating how utilitarian and deontological arguments for and against lockdowns 
impact trust in leaders. In the current work, our goal was to investigate patterns of trust 
in leaders across a variety of pandemic dilemmas, rather than just focusing on one 
dilemma. If we see consistent mistrust in utilitarian leaders across Lockdown, 
Ventilators and Tracing dilemmas (as we saw in our pilot data), we can reasonably 
conclude that endorsement of instrumental harm reduces trust in leaders. These three 
dilemmas are very different, but what they have in common is a tension between 
maximizing aggregate welfare and respective rights and duties. 
 
 
3. How this work advances understanding of moral dilemmas and trust. 
There is growing evidence that utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas impact trust (e.g. 
Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018; Everett, Pizarro, & 
Crockett, 2016; Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017; Sacco et al. 2017; Uhlmann, 2013). 
However, this past research has several limitations:  
1. It has been conducted using highly artificial hypothetical moral dilemmas (such 
as the trolley problem) that most people will never encounter in their daily lives. 
2. It has focused mainly on trust in anonymous strangers and largely ignored trust 
in political leaders. 
3. It has focused mainly on how endorsement of instrumental harm in sacrificial 
dilemmas impacts trust, and has for the most part ignored the positive 
component of utilitarianism, impartial beneficence. 
4. It has typically only been conducted in a limited number of Western populations 
(e.g. the US, Belgium and Germany).  
 
The proposed work provides a significant advance by studying how both instrumental 
harm and impartial beneficence impact trust in leaders, by studying real-life dilemmas in 
the context of an ongoing global crisis, and by testing our hypothesis across a diverse 
set of populations around the globe. By grounding our work in prior theory and 
evidence, the present studies will be not only relevant to understanding human behavior 
in the current pandemic, but also in global crises more broadly, including future 
pandemics and climate change. Below we elaborate on these points. 
Beyond artificial hypothetical dilemmas 
Previous work on moral dilemmas and trust has mostly used artificial “trolley-style” 
moral dilemmas in which the target must make a decision about whether it’s morally 
acceptable to save lives by, for example, pushing a large man off a footbridge to stop a 
runaway train or using lab assistants as human guinea pigs to see which of two 
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mislabelled substances will kill. While such dilemmas are valuable tools in moral 
philosophy and psychology, most people will not have encountered dilemmas such as 
these in their daily lives and therefore the findings might not generalize to “real” moral 
dilemmas such as those that arise during a global health crisis. The COVID-19 
pandemic has brought to bear numerous real moral dilemmas that are being debated by 
real political leaders, covered in real media outlets and followed by real people all 
around the world. These real dilemmas are the focus of the current work. By studying 
them, we can determine the extent to which past findings based on hypothetical, 
artificial dilemmas generalize to real dilemmas. 
Advancing knowledge of trust in leaders.  
We study how responses to moral dilemmas shape trust in leaders, moving beyond the 
previous focus on how ordinary people are evaluated based on their moral judgments. 
Most previous work has focused on trust in dyads, looking at how we infer the moral 
character of ordinary people who make decisions in moral dilemmas. Yet we know that 
utilitarianism differentially impacts perceptions of ordinary people and political leaders 
(Everett et al. 2018), which means we cannot generalize from past research on trust in 
utilitarians to a leadership context. Consider, for example, the (perhaps apocryphal) 
story of Winston Churchill who was told that the city of Coventry would be heavily 
bombed, and was faced with a decision to evacuate or not. If he evacuated the city the 
residents would be safe, but this might potentially reveal to the Germans that their code 
had been cracked. If he left the residents to their fate they would suffer great harm, but 
the secret of the code-breaking would remain intact and this, in turn, would likely lead to 
the war being over much sooner - saving many more thousands, if not millions, of lives. 
Churchill is said to have made the classic utilitarian calculation that it would be better to 
let some people suffer now for the greater good. That is, he endorsed instrumental harm 
- and is celebrated as a national hero. Indeed, some work shows that utilitarians are 
perceived as more competent than non-utilitarians (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017) and 
to the extent that trust in leaders is related to perceptions of their competence, it is 
possible that utilitarian approaches to pandemic dilemmas will increase rather than 
decrease trust in leaders. On balance however, the existing evidence suggests that 
political leaders who endorse instrumental harm would indeed be seen as less 
trustworthy - just like ordinary people who endorse instrumental harm are seen as less 
trustworthy and less suitable to be a political leader (Everett et al. 2018). 
Beyond instrumental harm. 
The vast majority of previous work on trust in utilitarians has focused on the negative 
dimension of utilitarianism (instrumental harm). But as outlined in the two-dimensional 
model of utilitarian psychology (Everett & Kahane, 2020; Kahane et al., 2018), 
utilitarianism involves more than just decisions about whether to sacrifice one to save a 
greater number. Instead, at the core of utilitarianism is the idea of impartial beneficence, 
that we must impartially maximise the well-being of all sentient beings on the planet in 
such a way that “[e]ach is to count for one and none for more than one” (Bentham, 
1789/1983), not privileging compatriots, family members, or ourselves over strangers – 
or even enemies. Critically, these two dimensions of instrumental harm and impartial 
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beneficence are both conceptually and psychologically distinct, with different 
psychological correlates (Kahane et al. 2015; Kahane et al. 2018) and there is evidence 
that they rely on different psychological processes (Capraro, Everett, & Earp, 2019). 
How would endorsement of impartial beneficence in moral dilemmas shape trust? 
Almost no work has considered this. The one exception is Everett et al (2018), who 
looked at perceptions of ordinary people who endorsed impartial beneficence (or 
instrumental harm) and found that impartial utilitarians were consistently disfavored for 
roles involving a direct interpersonal relationship, but that they were sometimes (but not 
always) preferred for distant, impersonal roles like a political leader. It is not clear, 
however, how robust this finding is, and whether we would see different results when 
looking at people explicitly described as political leaders - especially during a global 
crisis.  
Generalizing across populations. 
Past work on inferring trust from moral decisions has been conducted in just a handful 
of Western populations – the US, UK, and Germany – and so may not generalize to 
other countries that are also affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Given well-publicized 
concerns about the WEIRDness of most published psychology research, it is important 
to move beyond such samples and establish the cultural generalizability of findings. 
Indeed, given observations of cultural variation in the willingness to endorse sacrificial 
harm, it is not a foregone conclusion that utilitarian decisions will impact trust in leaders 
universally. 
 
4. On the intuitiveness of our hypotheses. 
Is it not just obvious that people would trust leaders who reject instrumental 
harm? We think that there are good reasons to expect that utilitarian leaders who 
endorse instrumental harm would be trusted less based on previous empirical work and 
anecdotal data, but this is certainly not a foregone conclusion. Some work shows that 
people perceive those who endorse instrumental harm as less warm but more 
competent (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017), and prefer others who made 
characteristically utilitarian judgments for organizational leadership positions like a 
hospital manager (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017), and other work shows that people 
strategically choose to endorse instrumental harm when the context favours 
competence-related traits, but are less likely to endorse instrumental harm when the 
context favours warmth-related traits (Rom & Conway, 2018). To the extent that political 
leadership requires competence, we might expect instead that people would favour 
leaders who make the decision to allow harm some to benefit the greater good - just as 
the wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill is praised in the (probably apocryphal) 
story of allowing inhabitants of Coventry to be killed in order to shorten the war and 
thereby indirectly save many more lives (see Supplementary Note 3). Both possibilities 
are plausible, though on balance the existing evidence suggests that political leaders 
who endorse instrumental harm would indeed be seen as less trustworthy - just like 
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ordinary people who endorse instrumental harm are seen as less trustworthy and less 
suitable to be a political leader (Everett et al. 2018). 
Similarly, is it not just common sense that people would prefer leaders who endorse 
impartial beneficence? We don’t think so. We predicted that people would trust leaders 
who endorse impartial beneficence more because people who endorse impartial 
beneficence are seen to make better political leaders, but not better friends, (Everett, 
Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018), consistent with other evidence that people do not 
endorse efficient maximization in charitable giving unless one is in a position of 
responsibility, like a political leader (Berman, Barasch, Levine, & Small, 2018). But we 
could also have predicted that leaders who endorse impartial beneficence would be 
trusted less precisely because they violate the norm of protecting their own citizens, 
since we know that intergroup partiality (here, “our” citizens vs. “others”) is expected 
and favored in group leaders (e.g. Duck & Fielding, 1999, 2003). While overall both the 
existing evidence and anecdotal data suggest that impartial beneficence is more likely 
to increase trust, this is far from a foregone conclusion. 
 
5. Potential cross-cultural differences in our study. 
We hypothesize that endorsement of instrumental harm will reduce trust in leaders, 
while endorsement of impartial beneficence will increase trust in leaders. The main goal 
of our study is to assess the cross-cultural stability of this hypothesis. Given the 
required format for a Registered Report, we are limiting our focus to our specific, pre-
registered predictions and not measuring other theoretical constructs that could 
potentially be relevant but which are outside our focus. We opted not to examine 
potential cross-cultural differences in this study because such differences might be 
confounded with pandemic severity, which differs dramatically across countries. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that there will be cross-cultural differences in our 
results. Should such differences emerge, we can conduct exploratory analyses with 
country-level indices (e.g. tightness/looseness, Human Development Index, pandemic 
severity, government policies related to the pandemic) but these are not discussed in 
the Stage 1 manuscript given the requirements of Registered Reports. We will make our 
data publicly available upon publication, so other researchers will be welcome to 
explore other questions with secondary analyses. Aside from testing our central 
question about trust in leaders, the data we’re collecting will also be, to our knowledge, 
the largest cross-cultural dataset of moral judgments about pandemic dilemmas and 




6. Impartiality in the Ventilators, Medicine and PPE dilemmas. 
 
Aren’t the Ventilators, Medicine and PPE dilemmas all about impartiality? Why is the 
Ventilators dilemma considered an Instrumental Harm dilemma and not an Impartial 
Beneficence dilemma?  
 
It’s correct that all three of these dilemmas concern how to distribute resources to 
different people, and involve a tension between treating everyone equally versus 
prioritizing some people. However, there are key theoretical differences (which we also 
confirm empirically in our pilot data) between the Ventilators dilemma and the 
Medicine/PPE dilemmas that make them clear examples of instrumental harm and 
impartial beneficence, respectively. 
 
The first crucial point is that impartial beneficence refers to a preference to impartially 
maximize aggregate welfare, and is therefore conceptually distinct from both generic 
prosociality and from non-maximizing impartiality. Allocating ventilators equally (i.e. 
regardless of personal characteristics) does not maximize aggregate welfare because 
older and sicker people are less likely to survive treatment, and have fewer years of 
quality life left to live. As Savulescu et al. (2020) describe in their paper applying 
utilitarian theory to the COVID pandemic, “Utilitarianism would reject the idea of 
employing any form of ‘first come, first served’ to decide about treatment. The timing of 
when a patient arrives needing treatment is morally irrelevant to whether or not they 
should receive treatment… According to utilitarianism, doctors should be prepared to 
withdraw treatment from poor prognosis patients in order to enable the treatment of 
better prognosis patients if they arrive later”. Maximizing aggregate welfare is what 
matters from a utilitarian standpoint and, therefore, allocating ventilators equally is not a 
utilitarian policy, even though it is impartial. Moreover, prioritizing younger over older 
people is a utilitarian policy that involves instrumental harm: some people are denied 
treatment, or even have treatment taken away, in order to maximize aggregate welfare. 
 
To validate empirically that the Ventilators dilemma does indeed tap instrumental harm 
and not impartial beneficence, we find that policy preferences in this dilemma correlate 
with the former and not the latter. In Pilot 2 we find that participants’ own endorsement 
of prioritizing the young and healthy for Ventilators was significantly positively correlated 
with their instrumental harm score on the OUS (r = 0.36, p < .001) but not their impartial 
beneficence score (r = -0.02, p = 0.737).  
 
In contrast, the Medicine and PPE dilemmas display the opposite pattern of results. 
Endorsement of sending resources where they are needed most was significantly 
positively correlated with OUS scores of impartial beneficence (Medicine: r = 0.35, p < 
.001; PPE: r = 0.38, p < .001), but not instrumental harm (Medicine: r = -0.12, p = .022; 
PPE: r = 0.05, p = .390).  
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For these reasons - both theoretical and empirical - we believe that the Ventilators 
dilemma is indeed tapping into the domain of instrumental harm rather than impartial 
beneficence, while the Medicine and PPE dilemmas tap impartial beneficence rather 
than instrumental harm. 
 
7. Ruling out a general preference for leaders who are less restrictive. 
Our theory predicts a very specific overall pattern of results across dilemmas: that 
people will trust the non-utilitarian leader more in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, while 
they will trust the utilitarian leader more in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. It is also 
possible that people simply prefer leaders who are less restrictive. This might be 
especially relevant for democracies that place a strong priority on individual liberty and 
freedoms, such as the United States. Such a preference would predict that people will 
distrust leaders who impose lockdowns and mandatory contact tracing policies, and that 
people will distrust utilitarian and non-utilitarian leaders equally in the Ventilators, 
Medicine and PPE dilemmas. This overall pattern predicted by a preference for less 
restrictive leaders is not what we found in our pilots and it is not what we expect to see 
in our main study.  
Dilemma Pilot results Preference for less restrictive 
leaders 
Lockdown (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
Ventilators (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian No preference 
Tracing (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer non-utilitarian 
Medicine (IB) Prefer utilitarian No preference 
PPE (IB) Prefer utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
 
8. Ruling out a general preference for leaders who treat everyone equally. 
Our theory predicts a very specific overall pattern of results across dilemmas: that 
people will trust the non-utilitarian leader more in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, while 
they will trust the utilitarian leader more in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. Another 
possibility is that people simply prefer leaders who treat everyone equally. Such a 
preference would predict that people will prefer leaders who allocate ventilators equally 
and distribute medicines and PPE impartially around the globe, and that people will 
distrust utilitarian and non-utilitarian leaders equally in the Lockdown and Tracing 
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dilemmas. This overall pattern predicted by a preference for egalitarian leaders is not 
what we found in our pilots and it is not what we expect to see in our main study. 
Dilemma Pilot results Preference for egalitarian 
leaders 
Lockdown (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian No preference 
Ventilators (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer non-utilitarian 
Tracing (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian No preference 
Medicine (IB) Prefer utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
PPE (IB) Prefer utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
 
9. Ruling out a general preference for leaders who seek to minimize COVID-
related deaths. 
Our theory predicts a very specific overall pattern of results across dilemmas: that 
people will trust the non-utilitarian leader more in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, while 
they will trust the utilitarian leader more in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. It is also 
possible that people simply prefer leaders who seek to minimize deaths from COVID-
19. Such a preference would predict a preference for leaders who impose lockdowns, 
prioritize younger over older people for ventilators, impose mandatory contact tracing, 
and distribute medicines and PPE impartially around the globe. This overall pattern 
predicted by a preference for leaders who seek to minimize COVID-related deaths is not 
seen in our pilots and we do not expect to find this in our main study.  
Dilemma Pilot results Preference for leaders who 
minimize COVID deaths 
Lockdown (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer non-utilitarian 
Ventilators (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
Tracing (IH) Prefer non-utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
Medicine (IB) Prefer utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
PPE (IB) Prefer utilitarian Prefer utilitarian 
32 
10. Generalizability of trust measures.  
Because our voting task involves asking participants to vote for a leader who will be 
responsible for a group donation, one might ask whether this measure can be 
generalized to overall trust in leaders, or if it is just specific to charity contexts.  
Our voting task is not intended to measure trust in general, but this is by design. We 
designed this task to complement our self-report measures of trust, which capture trust 
in general (“How trustworthy do you think this person is?”, and “How likely would you be 
to trust this person’s advice on other issues?”).  
We wanted to go beyond these self-report measures of general trust by including a 
behavioral measure of trust that involves real incentives. Any behavioral measure 
involving real incentives will necessarily involve a specific context; even the popular 
“Trust Game” involves the specific (and rather artificial) context of investing money with 
a stranger.  
 
Because it is necessary to choose a specific context for a behavioral task, we 
considered many possibilities when designing the voting task. We chose a context that 
is highly relevant to our central research question: trust in leaders during a public health 
crisis. In the current pandemic, effective leadership involves being a responsible 
steward of public resources in order to help those in need. Our voting task measures 
how much people will trust someone to be a responsible steward of a group’s donations 
to help those in need. We therefore think that the context we chose for our behavioral 
task bears directly on our research question and measures preferences for a specific 
type of leadership with clear relevance to the pandemic. Our pilot results suggest that 
these two types of measures (self-report and behavioral) tap a common core, with 
identical patterns in the predicted direction for all measures of trust, suggesting our 
results will generalize across diverse measures of trust. 
 
11. The relationship between the voting task and the concept of impartial 
beneficence.  
 
Because our voting task involves voting for a leader to be a responsible steward of a 
group’s donations to help those in need, one might ask whether this task is too closely 
connected to the concept of impartial beneficence. The concept of impartial beneficence 
taps the endorsement of the impartial maximization of the greater good, even at the cost 
of personal self-sacrifice, and one example item in the impartial beneficence sub-scale 
of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale is “It is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t 
really need if one can donate it to causes that provide effective help to those who will 
benefit a great deal”. It might be questioned whether our voting task, which involves 
voting for a leader who has the option to transfer a group’s donations to a charity or to 
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keep some money for themselves, might therefore be too closely connected to the 
construct of impartial beneficence. 
It is important to note, however, that the participants in our main study do not 
themselves make any decisions about whether to donate to charity or not: the focus of 
our study is not charitable donation behavior. Rather, we ask whether people are more 
likely to trust utilitarian or non-utilitarian leaders to be responsible for other people’s 
charitable donations -- a very different decision than a decision to donate to charity. 
Indeed, in our pilot results we find no evidence that participants’ decisions in the voting 
task is influenced by their own endorsement of impartial beneficence: these scores did 
not predict choice of leader in the task, and the effects of leader argument on voting 
behavior remain significant when controlling for impartial beneficence. 
 
12. Why we chose UNICEF as the charity in the voting task. 
We put a lot of thought into our decision of which charity to use. Because we are 
running our study across 22 countries, we needed to select a charity that is 
internationally recognized and generally regarded as reliable and efficient across all 
countries in our sample. Not many charities fit these criteria; we originally selected The 
Red Cross/Crescent, but Pilot 2 results and comments from our collaborators in Asia 
suggested that this charity is seen as unreliable in many countries. We therefore settled 
on UNICEF as the best option.  
 
13. Ruling out a general preference for leaders who participants agree with on 
policy issues. 
We anticipated the possibility that people might simply prefer leaders who they agree 
with on policy issues. This is why, for each dilemma, we first ask participants which 
policy they prefer. We then control for individual policy support in all planned analyses. 
Our pilots using this analytic approach show that even after controlling for people’s own 
policy preferences, the leader’s policy argument impacts trust (see Pilot Data). What 
this means is that the leader’s endorsement of instrumental harm or impartial 
beneficence in these dilemmas has a significant impact on trust, over and above the 










Supplementary Table 1. Countries, recruitment platforms, survey languages, 
planned sample size, and final obtained sample sizes. Participants in all countries 
were able to select English as their language in addition to the country’s language, 
specified here in “Survey Language”. 
 
Country Recruiting Platform 
Survey 
Language Planned N Final N 
Australia Lucid English 1000 994 
Brasil Lucid Portguese 1000 1298 
Canada Lucid English 1000 1102 
Chile CESS Santiago  Spanish 1000 1468 
China Lucid Chinese  1000 1517 
Denmark Epinion  Danish 1000 1155 
France Lucid French 1000 1073 
Germany Lucid German 1000 1192 
India Lucid Hindi 1000 1269 
Israel Panel HaMidgam Hebrew 1000 851 
Italy Lucid Italian 1000 1132 
Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia Lucid Arabic 500 757 
Mexico Lucid Spanish 1000 1260 
Netherlands Lucid Dutch 1000 1143 
Norway Norstat Norweigan 1000 1217 
Singapore Lucid English 1000 848 
South Africa Lucid English 1000 1120 
South Korea Dataspring Korean 1000 797 
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Spain Lucid Spanish 1000 1253 
United Arab 
Emirates Lucid Arabic 500 734 
United Kingdom Prolific English 1000 863 
United States Prolific English 1000 886 
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Supplementary Table 2. Participant information for the self-report and voting task 
in each country.  Table includes final sample size, mean age, participants' self-
reported gender identity (as a woman, man, or another gender identity). 
 
Country Self-Report Task Voting Task 









   Woman Man Other    Woman Man Other  
Australia 790 47.59 445 341 4 574 47.92 321 250 3 
Brasil 868 40.45 430 429 9 542 39.21 253 285 4 
Canada 913 48.62 467 441 5 647 46.79 334 309 4 
Chile 943 41.49 474 447 22 575 39.99 276 285 14 
China 771 39.64 384 367 20 639 41.84 321 298 20 
Denmark 883 46.95 459 421 3 648 47.34 328 319 1 
France 878 48.74 474 402 2 638 47.77 322 315 1 
Germany 990 50.83 466 518 6 741 51.75 342 396 3 
India 843 37.92 424 417 2 777 38.83 361 413 3 
Israel 711 43.00 353 353 5 328 40.20 162 165 1 
Italy 932 48.56 450 476 6 360 44.73 175 184 1 
Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 
541 31.23 292 246 3 447 31.33 234 210 3 
Mexico 777 38.76 404 364 9 600 38.35 289 304 7 
Netherlands 828 47.48 444 377 7 750 47.59 401 342 7 
Norway 1060 45.96 560 495 5 448 43.22 237 208 3 
Singapore 536 35.63 243 289 4 443 35.30 209 229 5 
South Africa 879 39.43 459 415 5 670 38.65 353 314 3 
South Korea 453 45.34 238 215 0 409 46.20 194 214 1 




519 31.14 251 260 8 439 31.30 217 215 7 
United Kingdom 809 45.93 423 382 4 685 46.05 357 325 3 









Supplementary Figure 1. Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Countries of 
Recruitment at the Time of Data Collection. (A) Number of confirmed COVID-19 
cases per 100 thousand people in each country of intended recruitment. (B) Number of 
COVID-19 deaths per 100 thousand people in each country of intended recruitment. (C) 
Absolute number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in each country of intended recruitment. 
(D) Absolute number of COVID-19 deaths in each country of intended recruitment. 
COVID-19 confirmed cases and death rates were taken from the COVID-19 Data 
Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns 
Hopkins University3 (last update: November 26th, 2020). Population estimates for each 
country were taken from the United Nations’ World Population Prospects (last update: 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Self Reported Trust in Pilot 1. Average self-reported trust 
in utilitarian vs non-utilitarian leaders in Pilot 1 (N = 98), separately for Instrumental 
Harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Tracing, and Ventilators) and Impartial Beneficence 
dilemmas (Medicine and PPE). Non-utilitarian leaders were seen as more trustworthy 
than utilitarian leaders for Instrumental Harm dilemmas (B = -1.18, SE = 0.10, t(875) = -
11.72, p < .001, CI = [-1.37, -0.98]), while the reverse was observed for Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas (B = 1.15, SE = 0.12, t(875) = 9.37, p < .001, CI = [0.91, 1.39]). 
Bars correspond to median scores, lower and upper hinges correspond to the first and 
third quartiles, respectively, and whiskers ends correspond to the most extreme data 
points within 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
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Supplementary Figure 3. Self Reported Trust by Dilemma in Pilot 1. Average self-
reported trust in utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian leaders in Pilot 1, separately for each 
dilemma, including both Instrumental Harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Ventilators, and 
Tracing) and Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (Medicine and PPE). Non-utilitarian 
leaders were seen as more trustworthy than utilitarian leaders in both Instrumental 
Harm dilemmas, but not in either Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. Bars correspond to 
median scores, lower and upper hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles, 
respectively, and whiskers ends correspond to the most extreme data points within 1.5 
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Supplementary Figure 4. Self Reported Trust in Pilot 2. Average self-reported trust 
for the utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian leaders in Pilot 2 (N = 469), separately for 
Instrumental Harm dilemmas (Lockdown and Ventilators) and Impartial Beneficence 
dilemmas (Medicine and PPE). Non-utilitarian leaders were seen as more trustworthy 
than utilitarian leaders in Instrumental Harm dilemmas (B = -2.02, SE = 0.17, t(454) = -
11.59, p < .001, CI = [-2.36, -1.68]), but not in Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (B = 
0.86, SE = 0.17, t(455) = 5.00, p < .001, CI = [0.52, 1.19]). Bars correspond to median 
scores, lower and upper hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles, respectively, 
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Supplementary Figure 5. Self Reported Trust by Dilemma in Pilot 2. Average self-
reported trust in utilitarian vs non-utilitarian leaders in Pilot 2, separately for each 
dilemma, including both Instrumental Harm dilemmas (Lockdown and Ventilators) and 
Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (Medicine and PPE). Non-utilitarian leaders were seen 
as more trustworthy than utilitarian leaders in both Instrumental Harm dilemmas, but not 
in either Impartial Beneficence dilemmas. Bars correspond to median scores, lower and 
upper hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles, respectively, and whiskers ends 









































Supplementary Figure 6. Voting Choices in Pilot 2. Model estimates of the 
percentage of participants who chose to entrust utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian leaders in 
the voting task in Pilot 2 (N = 452), separately for Instrumental Harm (Lockdown and 
Ventilators) and Impartial Beneficence dilemmas (Medicine and PPE). Non-utilitarian 
leaders were more likely to be voted in Instrumental Harm dilemmas, but not in Impartial 
Beneficence dilemmas (B = 2.41, SE = 0.33, z = 7.30, p < .001, CI = [1.77, 3.13], OR = 














































































































































































































Supplementary Figure 7. Actual vs. Expected Number of Men and Women in Each 
Country. Black lines indicate the final number of women and men in our dataset 
(across both self-report and voting tasks), while red ones indicate the expected number 


















































































































































































































































































































































































Supplementary Figure 8. Actual vs. Expected Number of Participants for Age 
Categories in Each Country. Black lines indicate the final number of participants for 
each age category in our dataset (across both self-report and voting tasks), while red 
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